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Failure to Engage:
The Regulation of Proprietary Trading Systems
Polly Nyquistt
Like much of the world, the securities business has been dramatically
affected by the development of computer technology. In an industry where
speed and information are the tools of the trade, computer systems that increase
traders' ability to gather information and execute faster trades have been
welcomed and widely applied. The role of computers has taken a variety of
forms. The National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
(NASDAQ) system market, which is currently the second largest volume
market in the United States, has no single physical location and is almost
exclusively computer-driven. Even the more traditional physical exchanges like
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) have computerized many of their
functions.
This Article will focus on one new development in the convergence of
computer technology and the securities industry: the emergence of proprietary
trading systems (PTSs). PTSs are for-profit systems, owned by broker-dealers
or other private entities, that offer traders an alternate market, or exchange
facility, in which to execute trades. While the volume of trading on PTSs is
relatively small, these systems represent the beginning of a new trend in
securities trading and may be a harbinger of broader changes. The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has highlighted the unique regulatory
problems presented by the recent explosive growth of these systems in its
"Market 2000" report and has promulgated a new rule to increase reporting
requirements for these systems. More recently, the SEC has proposed another
regulation aimed at increasing public access to information about trading
interest displayed in these systems. Many issues, however, remain unresolved,
and the SEC has promised to monitor carefully the development and growth of
these systems.
The SEC has struggled to fashion the appropriate reglatory approach to
these systems for more than 20 years. This Article will argue that the SEC's
approach, current and past, has been both inconsistent and ill-advised, suffering
both from political pressure from the PTSs themselves, but more importantly
from the SEC's historical reluctance and inability to deal with the overall
structure of securities markets. In approaching the PTS issue, the SEC has
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emphasized that PTSs are used primarily by sophisticated investors, for whom
the SEC has typically provided lower levels of regulatory protection. In doing
so, however, the SEC has failed to address the effect of these systems upon the
operation of the securities market as a whole. The result is an unstable balance
between encouraging these systems to develop fully while at the same time
integrating them into the current regulatory framework.
Part I outlines the historical context for the PTS debate, delineating both
the regulatory structure for securities markets and the major policy issues.
Included in this discussion is the 1975 congressional enactment of Amendments
to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,' which established the "National Market
System" goals that have shaped much of the rhetoric in the PTS debate. This
Part also discusses the changes in investors and markets since 1975 that have
created the current state of the securities markets, and highlights those changes
that have encouraged the development of PTSs, which in turn are part of a
broader transformation in the markets that poses new regulatory challenges for
the SEC. Part II details the various PTSs and discusses the relationship
between their development and two particular policy issues: the trend toward
"market fragmentation," and the intramarket competition with the existing self-
regulatory organizations (SROs). Part III outlines the regulatory structure for
PTSs and argues that the SEC's regulatory efforts have been inconsistent and
inappropriate. This part also critiques the SEC's "Market 2000" recommenda-
tions and the Commission's recently released rule, and discusses the need for
a different approach to the PTS issue. Finally, Part IV offers an alternate
regulatory approach to balance more successfully a desire to encourage the
growth of these systems with the need for regulatory oversight.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Primary Functions of the US. Securities Market: The Centralized Model
From the inception of the modern system, equity securities in the U.S. have
been offered and traded in several different places, which were designed to
operate as relatively centralized markets.2 A centralized system is designed to
enhance a variety of market functions, including increased capital liquidity,
accurate price discovery, best execution monitoring, and increased transparen-
cy. In recent years, commentators have noticed a trend toward more
"fragmented" markets that may inhibit some of these efficiencies.3 Much of
1. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1995).
2. See, e.g., Development of a National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 14,416 [1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,502, at 80,026 (Jan. 26, 1978). A "centralized" market
is one where all (or substantially all) of the buyers and sellers of securities meet in one place or through
one mechanism.
3. "Market fragmentation" occurs when a security is traded in more than one market, such that
the supply and demand do not meet contemporaneously in one central location. Market fragmentation
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the debate regarding PTSs centers on their potential threat to some of these
essential functions.
1. Liquidity
Providing liquidity is one of the most important and highly touted functions
of the U.S. securities markets. In theory, centralization increases liquidity by
ensuring that more buyers and sellers are meeting in one place, thus increasing
the chances that a particular transaction will take place. The investors'
confidence in their ability to liquidate quickly equity interest in U.S. businesses
encourages them to hold their savings in such investments rather than in other
types of financial instruments such as savings accounts. This incentive, in turn,
lowers the cost of capital for corporations choosing to offer themselves for sale
in the public markets. Liquidity also facilitates corporate governance by
allowing individual investors to register their disapproval of corporate action
by selling the security and, if done en masse, lowering the price of the
security.'
By contrast, less centralized markets can lead to decreased liquidity for any
particular issue of stock. Because an order in any given market is interacting
with fewer contra offers, which are appearing in other, non-linked markets, it
is less likely that a successful match will result.' Thus, an investor holding any
given security, particularly one with a relatively thin market, will not be able
to sell as easily, making the investment riskier and capital more expensive.
This phenomenon has a self-fulfilling aspect to it: as liquidity decreases, market
makers and floor specialists become increasingly reluctant to take positions in
certain issues to cover supply and demand gaps because those positions may be
more difficult to unload later.6 The reduction of market maker activity further
reduces liquidity.
2. Price Discovery
Active and centralized trading markets also provide a valuation tool. If all
buy and sell orders interact at a single place, the determined price for a
security will reflect the true supply and demand in the total market, rather than
the supply and demand in any single portion of the market. Accurate pricing
can happen both geographically (i.e. the security is traded in more than one market) or temporally (i.e.
the securities are traded continuously rather than allowing all supply and demand to meet at one point
in time). Junius W. Peake & Morris Mendleson, Comments on Securities Exchange Commission Release
No. 34-30920, 15-16 (Nov. 3, 1992) (available in the SEC Public Document Room S7-18-92).
4. See JAMES D. Cox ET AL., 4 SECURITIES REGULATION (1991).
5. See DIvISION OF MARKET REGULATION, SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, MARKET 2000:AN
EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS, Study III, at 11I-1 [hereinafter MARKET
2000].
6. But see Minder Cheng & Anath Madhavan, In Search of Liquidity: Block Trades in the Upstairs
and Downstairs Markets, NYSE Working Paper 94-02, 48 (Oct. 1994) (finding that NYSE floor is still
highly liquid, even for large block transactions, indicating that specialists are holding large inventories).
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allows securities to be properly valued for tax and collateral purposes. More
importantly, the competitive securities market, at least in theory, prices
securities based on the information about the company that is in the market-
place. Centralized trading ensures that the price reflects the real worth of the
underlying corporation as determined by the entire market. Thus it assures that
capital is most efficiently distributed across the spectrum of available
investments.7
3. Best Execution Monitoring
Registered brokers in the U.S. are required to provide their customers with
the "best execution" of their orders: when a security is trading in more than
one market, they are required, with reasonable effort, to buy or sell the
security in the market where the price is most advantageous to the customer!
The greater the number of prices in the market, the more the individual
investor will have to rely on an intermediary to find the best price. If the
individual investor is to monitor the diligence of the intermediary in doing so,
she will have to monitor multiple markets herself. Centralized trading lowers
both the intermediary's search costs and the customer's monitoring costs.
4. Best Execution and Opportunities for Price Improvement
Some advocates of centralization have also argued that the central market
should operate, like the NYSE, on auction principles. They argue that the
auction market provides investors with an opportunity for "price improve-
ment." The order can interact with other orders on the floor of the exchange
and potentially reach a price that falls between the currently displayed best bid
and best offer.9 In contrast, dealer markets, such as the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD), do not provide such opportunities for execution
between the spread. Moreover, fragmented markets reduce the opportunities
for price improvement because fewer orders are interacting on the floor of the
central exchange and, to the extent that some orders are displayed only in one
other segment of the market, those orders do not get a chance to interact with
7. According to the "efficient capital markets" (ECM) hypothesis, the securities market will price
securities based on their underlying value. The validity of this theory has been challenged: the presence
of "noise" in the marketplace leads to inaccurate pricing as analysts and investors are unable to
distinguish valuable information from irrelevant information. For a more detailed discussion of the ECM
and its critics, see, for example RICHARD A. BREALEY, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 293-97
(1991). See also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549 (1984).
8. See Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 36,310, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,793 (Oct.
10, 1995).
9. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. VI, at AVI-16; National Market System: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 67, at 71-72 (1993) (prepared statement of William O. Donaldson, Chairman, NYSE)
[hereinafter 1993 House Hearings]. The NYSE's arguments about price improvement have been aimed
primarily at the growth of the NASDAQ market with competing market makers. However, some similar
fragmentation concerns could extend to PTSs.
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orders in the auction market and achieve price improvement.' I The actual
price improvement that is available in an auction market, as well as the actual
lack of such price improvement in a "fragmented" market, however, are open
to substantial debate."1 Beyond price improvement, fragmented markets may
not adequately deal with universal limit order protection or time priority
rules. 12
5. Achieving Centralization: Transparency
A centralized trading market can be achieved by having only one market
or by having various markets completely linked by an external computer
system, the so-called "black box." 3 Transparency refers to the ability of the
public to see volume and pricing information about trading in the public market
on a real-time basis.'4 Transparency can help achieve the benefits of central-
ization in a market with geographically separated trading centers. With regard
to price discovery, for instance, as information regarding trading prices and
volume is widely and quickly distributed, investors can see the "real" price at
which a security is trading and react accordingly, helping to reach the true
equilibrium price of the security at any given moment. Transparency can
achieve this uniform pricing across markets without physically linking the
markets. ' Transparency also allows individual investors to monitor best
execution by their intermediaries and may increase liquidity by enhancing the
integrity of the markets. 16
10. Order Execution Obligations, supra note 8, at 52,792.
11. While the NYSE argues that the auction market is the only forum that offers investors the
ability to achieve prices between the spread, only 22% of trades on the NYSE are between the spread.
MARKET 2000, supra note 5, exhibit 39 (giving data for the week of May 10-14, 1993). The NYSE,
however, has frequently challenged the use of this number. Instead, it prefers to focus on trading in
issues where the spread is only 1/8. In this sector of the trading, 70% of NYSE trades are between the
spread. The NYSE argues that this is where the real benefit of the auction market, where it is possible
for trades to meet within the smallest possible spread, is seen. Letter from James E. Buck, Senior Vice-
President, NYSE, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Jan. 19, 1994) (unpublished letter on file with
author). In contrast, prices on some of the PTSs are by design executed at the midpoint of the spread.
This opportunity for price improvement, however, would be available only to the sophisticated and
professional investors who have access to those systems.
12. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study II, at 111-2. This problem has been discussed with respect
to PTSs. 1993 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 299 (joint statement of the American, Philadelphia, and
Pacific Stock Exchanges).
13. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 4, at 1286-89 (discussing SEC's rejection of "black box" approach
to create one market). This approach was never adopted in the U.S. which, even from the onset of
securities regulation in 1934, had multiple market centers that had developed along local lines.
14. The SEC refers to both "pre-trade transparency," regarding trading interests (firm quotes and
limit orders), and "post-trade transparency," regarding the price and volume of complete transactions.
MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study IV, at IV-2.
15. Id. at IV-3.
16. Liquidity is enhanced because individual investors may have more confidence to participate in
a market they can see and understand and because the risk to market makers is reduced (as they are less
fearful of institutional investors trading on inside information about trading in the institutional market),
leading to lower spreads. Id. at IV-3. See also Order Execution Obligations, supra note 8, at 52,793
(discussing the benefits of increased transparency).
Yale Law & Policy Review
The SEC has increased its focus on this transparency in recent years and
devoted an entire section of its recent "Market 2000" study to an analysis of
transparency issues.17 The SEC considers increased transparency necessary
for the efficient functioning of centralized markets and has taken specific steps
toward this goal." Commentators, however, have criticized the SEC's
approach to transparency for several reasons. First, "there has been confusion
as to whether transparency should be a specific objective of, regulators or
instead is one result of the process of competition between financial exchang-
es."' Second, it is contended that complete transparency is not a proper goal
for the SEC.2'
While transparency can help mitigate the effect of market fragmentation,
it works only when all the markets are subject to similar real-time reporting
requirements and readily display both pre-trade and post-trade pricing
information. Market fragmentation inhibits transparency by allowing various
participants to hide their transactions more easily. The existence of off-
exchange trading environments, including the "upstairs" block trading at the
NYSE, PTSs, and foreign markets, some of which are subject to a lower
standard of real-time reporting than the regular markets, decreases the level of
transparency in the market.2 Thus, to the extent that the SEC is relying on
transparency, rather than physical centralization, to achieve certain market
goals, increased trading in these alternate markets may create problems.
Finally, market participants have been quick to point out the disadvantages
of forcing greater transparency. Many institutional investors are opposed to
increased transparency, particularly with respect to block trading, on the
grounds that such trading is "informationless," yet causes short-term price
17. One commentator notes that the term "transparency," as well as its status as an issue with
merit, is a relatively new phenomenon, although the underlying concepts contained in the term have
been discussed by the SEC for many years. He posits that the recent attention on this issue is due to an
increased use of computer technology in securities trading, which not only makes real-time reporting
a feasible idea, but also makes such information more valuable in a fast-paced and volatile trading
environment. J. Harold Mulherin, Market Transparency: Pros, Cons, and Property Rights, in
MODERNIZING U.S. SECURrTIES REGULATION: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 375 (Kenneth
Lehn & Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1992).
18. See, e.g., MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study IV, at IV-I n.l.
19. Mulherin, supra note 17, at 376.
20. Mulherin calls this the "paradox" of transparency: if prices are perfectly transparent and thus
perfectly priced, there is no benefit to be derived by discovering new information. Thus, faster access
to pricing information reduces an individual investor's incentive to do independent analysis, which will
reduce the actual amount of information communicated through pricing. Id. at 377.
21. Note that transparency can also be impeded by the individual trading strategies of the
participants themselves. In a continuous auction market like the NYSE, there are risks for the individual
investor to display a trading interest, by placing it on the limit order book, for example. If the price is
too low, it will be plucked off immediately, and if the price is too high, the investor will risk being
passed over and left holding an unwanted block. Thus, each individual investor would like a market
where her own interest was hidden while everyone else's was displayed. Given this situation, individual
investors will be reluctant to reveal true trading interests to the market, thus deceasing "pre-trade"
transparency. Robert A. Schwartz, Conpetition and Efficiency, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES




volatility. These investors argue that since their trading is done primarily with
respect to indexing adjustments rather than based on evaluations of the
underlying business performance, it does not communicate the kind of
information that is important to price discovery and capital distribution.22 As
the SEC points out, however, the marketplace can determine the information
value of such trading and decide whether or not to react to it. 23 In response
to claims that they unfairly benefit from fragmentation because they can
participate in the public market with inside information on trading in the
private institutional market, institutional investors counter that the immediate
market price fluctuation that follows announcement of a large block trade to the
floor is only temporary, and that the price usually adjusts immediately, so there
is no real benefit to the institutions that are trading on inside information. The
SEC questions this analysis. It argues that in a truly efficient market there
should be only one price at any one time, and any price differential, for
whatever reason, provides an opportunity for arbitrage-type profits that impose
a cost on the system. 24 Finally, opponents argue that increased transparency
on the organized markets will force trading even farther off-exchange, possibly
to the fourth market or foreign markets. As these trades will never be reported,
the overall level of information reaching the market will decrease.'
B. The Markets26
1. The Primary Exchanges: NYSE and AMEX
The New York Stock Exchange is and always has been the dominant
securities market in the U.S. In 1993, the NYSE accounted for 82% of the
consolidated tape trading volume in NYSE stocks and 70% of the reported
consolidated tape trades.27 This represents $2 trillion worth of trading during
that year.28 In addition, the NYSE also represents the largest chunk of the
total market capitalization in the U.S., $4.54 trillion, which outstrips all other
22. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study IV, at IV-4; see also Letter from Peter C. Clapman, Senior
Vice-President, TIAA-CREF to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Nov. 20, 1992) (available in SEC
Public Reference Room, File No. S7-18-92) [hereinafter TIAA-CREF Letter]; Letter from Dewitt F.
Bowman, Chief Investment Officer, CALPERS to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Oct. 15, 1992)
(available in the SEC Public Reference Room, File No. S7-18-92) [hereinafter CALPERS Letter].
23. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study IV, at IV-4. A recent empirical study has shown that the
price reaction to block trading is smaller than may have originally been thought. Cheng & Madhaven,
supra note 6, at 3 (suggesting that the trading is "informationless" and the market treats it as such).
24. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study IV, at IV-4.
25. See, e.g., Muiherin, supra note 17, at 379.
26. This Section will focus on markets that trade in primarily equity issues. There are, however,
other exchanges, such as the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), that facilitate trading only in
options and futures.
27. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1993 FACT BOOK 26 (1994) [hereinafter NYSE FACT BOOK].
28. Id. at 13; see also MARKET 2000, supra note 5, exhibit 13 (Jan. 1994) (estimating the average
daily dollar volume of trading on NYSE in 1992 at over $6.5 billion, compared to slightly more than
$3.5 million for next largest market, NASDAQ).
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markets combined.29
The NYSE is an auction market; it has a physical exchange floor where
customers' orders interact directly with one another through their brokers, or
interact with the floor specialist who is making a market in the particular
security. 30 The specialist post acts as a meeting place for all brokers interested
in a particular issue. The specialist manages the supply and demand flow in the
issue. The specialist also keeps the limit order book where customers can enter
and display their orders for holding until the buy/sell price is met.3'
In addition to the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) is also
considered a "primary" exchange, although it does not have nearly the trading
volume of the NYSE. AMEX does not provide a market for NYSE-listed
companies, but instead lists companies independently.
2. The Other Exchanges: Regional Exchanges, NASDAQ, and the Third
and Fourth Markets.
The NYSE competes with several other markets, including the regional
markets, the third and fourth markets, and the PTSs for volume in its own
securities. There are five other exchanges, like the NYSE, which are auction
markets with physical trading floors. These are generally referred to as the
"regional" markets, and include the Boston Stock Exchange (BSE), the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange (Phlx), the Cincinnati Stock Exchange (CSE), the
Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX),32 and the Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE).
These markets handle about 20% of the trading in NYSE securities; most of
it, however, is at the best bid/offer on the Intermarket Trading System (ITS),
thus limiting their role in price competition for the NYSE.33 Trading of
NYSE-listed securities also takes place in the so-called "third market."
Although the third market has not been consistently defined in the literature,
the SEC has referred to over-the-counter (OTC) trading of exchange-listed
securities as such a third market. 34 This trading accounts for a fairly small
portion of volume (7.4% of NYSE volume in 1993), and is primarily in small
29. NYSE FACT BOOK, supra note 27, at 8.
30. Note that under NYSE rules, the specialist is required to make a market in the security to cover
gaps in supply and demand and must maintain strict capital reserves in order to serve this function.
Supporters often point to this role of the specialist in helping the NYSE act as the market of last resort
and allow it to continue operating during periods of crisis. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Benveniste, Why the
National Exchanges Provide Superior Information Flows and Pricing, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES
REGULATION: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 421 (Kenneth Lehn & Robert M. Kamphuis, Jr.
eds., 1992).
31. The specialists' control over the limit order book has been the subject of some allegations that
specialists sometimes fail to reveal actual trading interest in a security, thus tainting the market price.
See Jeffrey Taylor et al., Little Guy Lost, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1994, at Al; Order Execution
Obligations, supra note 8, at 52,792-93.
32. The Midwest Stock Exchange was renamed the Chicago Stock Exchange in 1993.
33. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study IH, at 11-8.
34. Id. at IH-10.
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orders executed by discount brokers.3 5
Finally, the "fourth market" refers to trading done without any intervention
by a market professional, either directly between institutional investors or
internal crossing between accounts within a single institution.36 The fourth
market includes trading in any issues, including both NYSE and NASDAQ
listings. Institutional investors engage in these transactions to avoid the market
impact of exposure and the commissions paid to intermediaries. Because these
trades are not run through an institution with reporting requirements, like a
broker-dealer or an exchange, they are invisible to both the regulatory
authorities and the market in general. Thus, they present possible problems for
both the efficiency and accuracy of the public markets, and for regulatory
authorities. Many of the concerns about fourth market trading have also been
articulated with respect to PTSs. Although the size of this market cannot be
measured accurately, the SEC estimates that it accounts for several million
shares a day,37 and institutional money managers note that this process has
been operating for years, despite its logistical difficulties.38
The NYSE's major competitor for listings is NASDAQ, which, although
it is the second largest market in the U.S., is not an "exchange" registered
under section 6 of the Act, but rather is regulated as a "national securities
association" under section 15A of the Act.3 9 All brokers and dealers must be
members of a national securities association," and currently there is only one
such organization, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). The
NASD owns and operates NASDAQ, which is an automated interdealer quote
system. It has no physical location or trading floor, and instead of offering
continuous trading facilitated by a designated floor specialist, the NASDAQ
market depends on dealers who act as "market makers" in a particular security.
These market makers offer to buy or sell at "firm" prices entered on the
NASDAQ system, which is sometimes referred to as a "dealer" market. These
prices are then displayed on the screens of terminals located on the desks of
other brokers and dealers. For the majority of trading, brokers or dealers
wishing to execute a transaction with one of the market makers must pursue the
execution through telephone communication. Unlike on the NYSE floor, where
there is just one designated specialist making a market in a particular security,
any dealer can make a market in a security on NASDAQ provided they follow
35. Id. at 1-11.
36. Id. at IH-13. Trading directly between institutions is sometimes referred to as the "Rolodex"
market.
37. Id.
38. Beatrice E. Garcia, Big Investors to Cut Costs by "Fourth Market" Trades, WALL ST. J., May
15, 1987 (referring to an interview with the Vice President of RJR Nabisco's pension asset manager,
Robert Schultz).
39. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1995). Note that NASD brokers and dealers
can trade some NYSE listed securities through NASDAQ.
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 15(b)(2) (1995).
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NASD rules. Thus, for heavily traded issues, there may be more than one
dealer making a market and competing for transactions. In contrast, more
thinly traded issues may have only one market maker willing to buy or sell.
Theoretically, this competition should make the spread smaller on NASDAQ
issues, but as the recent NASD antitrust litigation indicates, there is some
argument that spreads have not been reduced in proper amounts.4 Most
NASDAQ stocks are subject to real time reporting to the Consolidated Tape
(CT). NASDAQ is currently linked to the ITS for listed stocks that are not
subject to off-board trading restrictions.'
3. Proprietary Trading Systems
Proprietary trading systems, also known as "automated trading systems"
or "broker dealer trading systems," are screen-based trading systems operated
for profit by individual broker-dealers that offer automated execution in various
forms and with various additional services. PTSs are used almost exclusively
by institutional and other professional investors and are typically neither useful
for, nor accessible to individual investors.43 Generally, PTSs offer customers
direct access to contra trading without the participation of intermediaries found
in the other organized exchanges.
C. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The current regulatory framework for the U.S. securities markets is a
product of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(or "the 1934 Act"). These legislative enactments established the basic
regulatory structure and rules, most of which were designed primarily to
protect the interests of individual investors. 44 The 1934 Act was part of the
41. Jeffrey Taylor& Warren Getler, U.S. Examines Alleged Price-Fixing on NASDAQ, WALL. ST.
J., Oct. 20, 1995, at Cl. Hans Stoll has also suggested that payment for order flow may also support
wider spreads by reducing price competition between competition market makers. Taylor, supra note
31, at A4. The NASD has vigorously denied the price fixing charges. See, e.g., Molly Baker, NASDAQ
Fights Back on Pricing Allegations, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1995, at Cl. Nonetheless, NASDAQ has
recently filed a rule change proposal to add a new computer trading system, "Aqcess," which will allow
investors to enter small limit orders (up to 3000 shares) at prices between the currently displayed best
bid/offer. These orders will be automatically displayed on all NASDAQ terminals and will be
automatically executed against any contra side match. This system is currently in the public comment
stage of the rule change procedure. William Power, NASDAQ Unveils Its Aqcess Order System In Move
to Aid Small Investors' Trading, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1995, at CI (hereinafter NASDAQ Unveils].
42. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study II, at II-12. In 1980, the SEC adopted Rule 19c-3, which
prohibited the NYSE from restricting off-board or OTC market making in securities listed on the NYSE
after April 26, 1979. Prior to that time, NYSE rules prohibited OTC market makers from making a
market in securities listed on the NYSE. See Off-Board Trading Restrictions, Exchange Act Release
16,888 [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,608 (June 11, 1980).
43. The PTSs are often considered part of the "fourth market" as they facilitate direct trading
between institutions. The SEC itself has specifically distinguished PTSs and the "fourth market," noting
that PTS trading always involves a registered broker-dealer and thus does not create the same reporting
and transparency problems of traditional "fourth market" trading. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study
11, at UI-13.




congressional reaction to the Great Depression, the beginning of which was
blamed on the 1929 stock market crash. The newly formed SEC was given
regulatory responsibility for monitoring the various exchanges, which together
constituted the "market." In a unique approach, the 1934 Act adopted a two-
tiered regulatory structure. In addition to the general regulatory oversight of
the SEC, the exchanges were to operate under the supervision of the SROs,
which are responsible for the daily operation of the exchanges and promulgate
the operating rules for each exchange. The SROs themselves are then subject
to oversight by the SEC.4
With this two-tiered structure, Congress intended to strike a balance
between protection of the integrity of the markets needed in the wake of Black
Monday and the flexibility necessary to maintain an economically vigorous
capital market.' The structure was also intended to balance the need for the
participation of the market professionals, achieved through SRO self-regulation,
and the need for an independent watchdog, the SEC.47 To achieve these
equilibria, Congress asked the SEC in its original mandate to wear two
different hats. Under the first, known as the "sunlight" hat, the SEC was to
encourage the disclosure of truthful and complete information by corporations
so investors could more accurately assess the value of the security. The second
was as a "market regulator," a hat which envisioned the SEC monitoring the
structure and functioning of the markets themselves.48
Some commentators have argued that the bifurcated regulatory structure,
in combination with the dual functions given the SEC, led the SEC to pursue
its "sunlight" rule vigourously, while leaving its more "regulatory" functions
to the SROs.49 It has been suggested that the SEC did not actively oversee the
decisions of the SROs, nor did it think about the structure of the markets in
any systematic way."° The development of the rules regarding information
disclosure, the prevention of fraud, and the enforcement of rules designed to
45. Generally, the SRO establishes rules governing the day-to-day operations of the markets, while
the SEC provides broader regulatory goals, such as fraud prevention, and oversees the SROs activities
by requiring that major SRO rule changes be submitted to the SEC for prior approval through a formal
proposal and comment period procedure.
46. Walter Werner, The SEC As a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REv. 755, 757 (1984).
47. COX, supra note 4, at 1189-93.
48. See, e.g., Loins Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 35 (1983).
49. The SEC's failure to deal with market structure issues began early. Market fragmentation
existed even in the early securities markets, created primarily by the NYSE's restrictive practices (i.e.
fixed commissions and limited membership), which drove both issuers and investors to find alternative
markets where trading was less restrictive. In 1936, Congress, at the urging of the SEC, attempted to
amend section 12(f) to raise the standards for unlisted trading privileges (which would have concentrated
trading by forcing it back to the NYSE), but the SEC, in administering these standards, was relatively
lenient in order to avoid destruction of the regional and over the counter markets. Werner calls this the
SEC's "first misadventure in regulating market structure" and concludes that this early failure led the
SEC to shift its focus to the sunlight aspects of its authority. Werner, supra note 46, at 760-63.
50. Id.
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protect investors has been actively pursued and shaped by the SEC since
1934. 5" The structure of the market, including both the NYSE and the
regional markets, was adopted essentially in its form as it existed in 1934.
Unlike disclosure rules, which the SEC has arguably developed around a
philosophical framework, the system structure is the result of market forces,
with the SEC chasing behind and regulating only in response to crisis.52
The original structure also created a dual role for the SROs, which has
contributed to the problem of regulating PTSs. While the SEC asked the SROs
to assume significant oversight responsibilities, their members rely on them to
protect their turf in a competitive market environment. 3 This latter role may
require the SROs to ask for the removal of the very regulatory restraints they
are also asked to enforce. The SROs' conflict of interest may encourage them
to fashion their rules in a manner that is favorable to their own interests, rather
than being responsive to the needs of the national securities markets.
54
D. 1975 Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act
A "back room" crisis55 in the 1960s, caused by the paper-driven market's
inability to deal with an increasing trade volume, led to the enactment of the
1975 Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act, the first major structural
reform effort since 1934. The primary focus of the 1975 Amendments was
adoption of section 11 A of the 1934 Act, which gave the SEC the mandate to
establish a "National Market System" (NMS).56 This term was not defined,
as Congress wanted to give the SEC and market forces the ability to create the
best system. 57 However, Congress outlined the goals it had for this system:
51. Norman Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market
System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883 (1981).
52. Loss, supra note 48, at 668; see also Poser, supra note 51, at 887.
53. See Werner, supra note 46, at 779 (discussing tension between regulatory and competitive roles
of SEC). The SEC and Congress have encouraged this intramarket competition in the belief that it will
make the markets more responsive to customer needs and will foster innovation, as seen in the 1975
NMS legislation; see also MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study VI, at VI-3 to VI-4.
54. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 4, at 1191-93 (discussing tension arising from SROs' regulatory
duties and their own self-interest, and potential for SROs to behave in anti-competitive manner).
55. The "back-room" crisis began in 1967, when the securities markets suffered from an explosive
growth in activity that placed operational strains on the almost entirely paper-driven system. As the
trading activity accelerated, broker-dealers were unable to keep pace with their settlement and clearance
duties, and large stacks of unprocessed security certificates began to pile up in the back offices of the
brokerage houses, resulting in numerous transactions failing to take place in a timely fashion and,
ultimately, the financial failure of several firms. By 1970, the system was showing severe signs of
strain, with both the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the total trading volume dropping precipitously.
In the study that resulted from this crisis, Congress determined that the securities industry had failed
to adequately modernize or centralize its clearance and settlement procedures. The call to revamp these
procedural issues ultimately led to a more wholesale discussion of the securities market structure and
adoption of the 1975 Amendments. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, 5 SECURITIES REGULATION, 2482-
86 (1990) [hereinafter Loss & SELIGMAN].
56. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 1 IA (1995); see also Notice of Adoption of Rule
1 lAb2-1 and Notice of Withdrawal of Proposed Rule 15c2-10, Exchange Act Release No. 11,673 [1975-
1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,302 (Sept. 23, 1975).
57. S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975).
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(1) create a level playing field for competition among various market
participants; (2) increase the dissemination of price quotes; (3) increase the
efficiency of the market; and (4) ensure "best execution."58
The debate over the meaning of the congressional mandate with respect to
the development of the NMS illustrates the underlying theoretical tension in the
regulation of the securities markets. As with the original drafting of the
securities regulation laws, the current debate vacillates between the desire for
centralized trading, which enhances price discovery, liquidity, and best
execution, and the desire for competition among the markets that will improve
the entire system through the "survival of the fittest." 59. With the 1975
Amendments, Congress and the SEC, in its rule-making activities, seem to
have sought both to encourage centralization through greater transparency and
to encourage intermarket competition. The NMS legislation did not resolve this
tension and thus leaves the SEC with an unclear mandate as to how to deal
with an issue such as the regulation of PTSs which implicates both goals.
The SEC and the markets have undertaken several projects designed to
implement the 1975 Amendments. The first, and perhaps the most successful
to date, was the establishment of the Consolidated Tape for real-time reporting
58. The text of the relevant portion of the statute is as follows:
(a)(1) The Congress finds that -
(A) The securities markets are an important national asset which must be preserved and
strengthened.
(B) New data processing and communications techniques create the opportunity for more
efficient and effective market operations.
(C) It is in the public interest and appropriate for the protection of investors and the
maintenance of fair and orderly markets to assure
(i) economically efficient execution of securities transactions;
(ii) fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and between
exchange markets and markets other than exchange markets;
(iii) the availability to brokers, dealers, and investors of information with respect to
quotations for and transactions in securities;
(iv) the practicability of brokers executing investors' orders in the best markets; and
(v) an opportunity, consistent with the provisions of clauses (i) and (iv) of this
subparagraph, for investors' orders to be executed without the participation of a dealer.
(D) The linking of all markets for qualified securities through communication and data
processing facilities will foster efficiency, enhance competition, increase the information
available to brokers, dealers, and investors, facilitate the offsetting of investors' orders, and
contribute to best execution of such orders.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § I1A (1995).
59. Werner argues that Congress was expecting the SEC to form a strong single market which
would centralize all order flow in a security, thus ending market fragmentation, maximizing liquidity,
and enhancing capital allocative efficiency. Werner believes that the SEC's attempt to enact this national
market system has been largely unsuccessful. Werner posits that the SEC has failed in this mandate
because of its early division between sunshine and regulatory capacities, and its institutional preference
for neglecting the latter. Werner, supra note 46, at 774-80. In contrast, some commentators, and the
SEC itself, believe that the original congressional vision was for a more limited system and that this
limited role of the NMS is being adequately served by existing procedures and market linkages. One
commentator has suggested that "Congress very carefully avoided calling for the homogenization of all
markets into a central market system," but instead called for "preserving, strengthening, and linking the
existing markets." Donald L. Calvin, The National Market System: A Successful Adventure in Industry
Sey-Improvement, 70 VA. L. REV. 785, 790 (1984); MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. H, AII-i 1.
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of trading in "eligible" securities,' ° and the Consolidated Quotation System
(CQS), which collects firm quotes from the various exchanges and OTC
dealers.6 The second major project, the Intermarket Trading System (ITS),
electronically links eight national exchanges and the NASD.62 The ITS
provides brokers on the floor of any participating exchange with a means of
executing a trade in any of the other markets, thus allowing the broker or
specialist to execute their transaction at the best displayed price. The ITS also
allows all participants to enter pre-opening interest in securities that will be
executed when the market opens. The participants in the ITS have developed
a set of uniform trading rules in order to enhance the effectiveness of the
system in actually linking the markets.6 3
60. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 lAa3-1 (1995). This rle requires all floor specialists and market makers
executing transactions in listed securities to immediately report the size and price of those transactions
to the Consolidated Tape Association (CTA) which, using the Securities Industry Automation Corpora-
tion (SIAC) (a joint venture between the NYSE and Amex), compiles this data and disseminates it to
various vendors. The vendors then distribute to investors, broker-dealers, and other members of the
public via computer terminals or the ticker tape. Thus, the Tape, which is constantly displayed and
updated during the trading day, shows potential buyers and sellers what the most recent consolidated
price, representing transactions in all different markets, is (this is known as "last sale" reporting) and,
in some cases, where that sale took place. The CTA fosters centralization by creating a single "market"
price for the security, rather than having several different prices in different market centers. LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 55, at 2548-54.
61. In contrast to the CTA, the CQS was designed to increase pre-trade transparency by distributing
"firm" quotes in a manner similar to the CTA distribution of last sale data. The CQS, however, has
been less successful. First, the rules were modified to allow regional market specialists to avoid the
"firm" quoting requirements, and more generally, the disseminated quotes tend to be inaccurate because
specialists underestimate their trading capacity in order to avoid posting a firm quote they cannot
profitably honor. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 55, at 2548-54. Pre-trade transparency has been
hindered by the lack of a consolidated limited order book (CLOB) which would require floor specialists
on the competing exchanges to enter the limit orders they are holding into the electronic link, after
which those limit orders would be displayed to all markets and could be executed in any market. While
the SEC has toyed with the idea of establishing a CLOB, most recently in the Market 2000 Study,
strong participant objection has so far stopped a CLOB from developing. See MARKET 2000, supra note
5, app. II, at Al-I1 to AII-12. But see Order Execution Obligations, supra note 8, at 52,799-803
(proposing changes to enhance transparency of limit orders).
62. ITS was developed as a joint project of five exchanges: NYSE, Amex, BSE, Phlx, and PSE.
Three other exchanges, the CHX, CSE, and CBOE, and the NASD have joined since the beginning of
operations. The NASD is linked by a computer interface with the NASD's Computer Assisted Execution
System (CAES) which was developed specifically for this purpose. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app.
II, at AII-2 to AII-3.
63. These rules concern "trade throughs," a practice whereby a broker executes a transaction at
a price that is higher (in the case of a buy) or lower (in the case of a sell) than the price being displayed
in another market, exposure and splitting of block trades, pre-opening trading participation, and dispute
resolution. The SEC notes that since its original conception, the ITS and the CTS have been enhanced
by changes such as the adoption of Rule 19c-3 and "trade-through" rules. The SEC also notes that while
the ITS exhibited problems during the 1987 crash (when it stopped functioning during the most critical
periods), the system has been strengthened with updated technology and showed better performance
during the 1989 crash. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. II, at AII-7 to AII-8. In conjunction with the
Market 2000 study, the SEC asked for comments on the functioning of the ITS. ITS participants (such
as the NYSE and the regional markets) believed that the ITS was serving its limited purpose adequately
and that the system should not be expanded to include, for instance, a consolidated limit order book.
On the other hand, non-participants (such as the Arizona Stock Exchange) indicated that the ITS was
not functioning to increase efficiency. Id. at AII-9 to AI-I 1. The SEC, in its Market 2000 Report,
generally did not support any significant expansion of the ITS system, although it did suggest that the
NASD/CAES link, which is currently only for Rule 19c-3 securities trading between the OTC and the
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E. The Current System: Changes Since 1975
The U.S. securities markets have seen several dramatic changes since the
enactment of the 1975 Amendments, which may question the continuing
viability of these reforms.' The purpose of the SEC's "Market 2000" study,
announced in 1992 and released in January 1994, was to analyze these market
changes and determine what, if any, regulatory response was needed. 6
1. Changes in Ilume
The first important change is the increase in the total volume and dollar
amount of equity securities traded in the United States. In 1975, the total
market value of U.S. equities was $85 billion. By 1992, the total market value
reached $5 trillion.' More individuals participate in the markets today than
ever before, either as individual investors or as members of the increasingly
large and popular mutual funds and pension plans. More businesses are turning
to the markets for their capital needs. Technological advances have allowed the
markets and the market professionals to handle the increasing demand for
access to the markets. Arguably, this huge growth means that the SEC, now
more than ever, needs to take an active role to protect the increasing
percentage of U.S. savings that are at risk in the markets.
2. Changes in Investors
One of the most important changes is the so-called "institutionalization" of
the ownership of equity securities in the U.S. In 1975, institutional investors
owned 30% of U.S. equity securities, but by 1992, they owned slightly over
50% of the market.67 Thus, individual investors now account for less than
50% of the market.' A 1990 survey by the NYSE indicated that 51 million
individuals in the U.S., or about 21% of the population, own corporate
exchanges, should be expanded to included all eligible ITS securities and to allow participation of OTC
dealers to trade non-19c-3 securities through the ITS/CAES link. Id. at All-12. Since the release of the
study, the NASD has filed a rule change to comply with this recommendation. See Order Approving
a Proposed Rule Change by National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Requiring Participation in
the Intermarket Trading System by Third Market Makers. Exchange Act Release No. 34,280, 59 Fed.
Reg. 34,880 (July 7, 1994).
64. Poser, supra note 51, at 885; Milton H. Cohen, A Quarter Century of Market Development:
What Should a New 'Special Study' Study?, in GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKErS AND THE DISTRmUTION OF
SECURITIES, 1 A.B.A. SEC. Bus. LAW 1-2 (Franklin E. Gill, ed., 1991).
65. U.S. Equity Market Structure Study, Exchange Act Release No. 30,920, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,587
(July 22, 1992).
66. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, exhibit 1.
67. Id., Study ]I, at H-1.
68. Id., app. I, at Al-i. Note that many more individuals are participating through "institutional"
investors, such as pension plans and mutual funds, which are discussed in the next section. This section
focuses on retail investing directly in the market, which is currently about $2.8 trillion. See Taylor,
supra note 31, at Al.
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stock.69 This is compared to the approximately 25 million individuals that
owned equity issues in 1975.7' Individuals do not trade directly on the
markets or with each other. Rather, individual investors trade through a
professional intermediary, such as a broker-dealer. Many securities regulations
have been aimed at protecting these individual investors from the potentially
fraudulent practices of professional intermediaries who have numerous
opportunities to defraud their relatively uninformed customers. The SEC rules
limit the activities of dealers, who conduct trades for their own accounts and
those of their customers, and require broker-dealers to offer their customers
"best execution" and "suitable" securities based on the customer's investment
objectives. The investors, for their part, are primarily interested in minimizing
their brokerage fees. These desires have given rise to several discount
brokerage houses that offer lower commissions in return for fewer information
services.
Institutional investors are professional money managers or financial
institutions who execute large numbers of transactions and manage large sums
of money. The largest of these are the private pension plans, which in 1992
owned about 20% of U.S. equities, an increase from the less than 13% the
pension funds owned in 1975.71 The second largest are the mutual funds,
whose market share has more than doubled since 1975, jumping from 4% to
9.1 % in 1992.72 Other types of institutional investors are hedge funds
(typically involving less than 100 individual investors), insurance companies,
and public pension funds.73
The growth in the amount of money held in pension funds has led to
several changes in their management that are significant for the structure of the
equity markets. First, pension funds are increasingly being turned over to
professional money managers who will more effectively and profitably manage
the funds. This trend has increased the concentration of capital in the hands of
these professionals. 4 Second, as part of their fiduciary duties, the pension
funds are increasingly trying to reduce the costs of the management and are
looking for competitive fee rates from brokers.75 The tremendous size of their
trading activity gives them power to negotiate for soft dollar arrangements and
69. NYSE FACT BOOK, supra note 27, at 85.
70. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. 1, at AL-.
71. Id., exhibit 1.
72. Id.
73. Public pension funds accounted for 9.1% of the market in 1992, making the total market share
of all pension funds nearly 30%. Id.
74. Id., Study n1 at 11-2.
75. See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 38; Ivy Schmerken, Wall Street's Quiet Revolution (Technology),
WALL ST. & TECH., June 1, 1992, at 25; Bruce B. Burr, Alternative Trading Exceeds Goals, PENSIONS
& INVESTMENTS, July 25, 1994, at 17. "A search for lower transactions costs may draw these investors
to PTSs where intermediary commissions are reduced." Cox, supra note 4, at 1322.
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lower commissions, a power that smaller individual investors lack.76 Third,
since performance of the funds is usually measured against a market index, like
the Standard & Poor's 500, the funds are usually passively managed on
indices,77 which further reduces transaction costs.
The goals of institutional investors lead them to seek services that the
traditional NYSE trading floor cannot offer, but which the PTSs can provide.
First, the PTSs' promise of anonymity is particularly important to institutional
investors since it allows them to reduce the market impact on the price of the
security that would result from trading extremely large blocks of stocks on the
floor. Second, in contrast to individual investors, it is often argued that the
ostensibly more sophisticated institutional investors do not need regulatory
protection from the market professionals because they can monitor the activities
of their own brokers to ensure that their trades are well executed and fair.
Thus, they are willing to trade less regulatory protection for the lower fees
paid on PTSs. Finally, institutional investors were shaken by the 1987 crash,
when many could not reach their dealers, who were unable or unwilling to
answer the phones or make trades.78 Thus, institutional investors welcome the
trading control and direct access the PTSs give them.79
3. Changes in the Markets
The markets themselves have also been changing in response to the
changing demands of the investors. The most striking changes are the shift in
the distribution of volume between the various exchanges and the increased use
of technology by both existing and emerging markets. Although the NYSE is
and always has been the largest of the equity markets, it is currently losing
market share to the regionals, NASDAQ, and other markets." This shift is
due in part to the activities of the institutional investors who like to route their
block trades through the regionals, where the specialists are less likely to
interfere with the crosses or force them to be exposed to the limit order book.
76. See Taylor, supra note 31, at Al (noting that since the 1975 unfixing of commissions,
commission costs for institutions have dropped 75 %, while retail commissions have increased 30 %, now
averaging almost 42 cents per share); see also Order Execution Obligations, supra note 8, at 52,793
(noting the lack of market power held by retail investors).
77. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study U, at 11-3. In contrast, mutual funds are being evaluated
on maximum performance rather than comparison to a benchmark index and thus are usually actively
managed rather than indexed. Id., at 11-2.
78. DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE OCTOBER 1987
MARKET BREAK, 9-19 (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter 1987 MARKET BREAK REPORT].
79. Ivy Schmerken, Off-Exchange Trading Chips Away at NYSE, WALL ST. & TECH., Dec. 12,
1992, at 42.
80. In 1976, the NYSE's share of the consolidated tape trades in NYSE stocks was 86%. MARKET
2000, supra note 5. exhibit 18. But since then, it has lost ground to the regionals, whose share has risen
from 11.5% in 1976 to 19.9% in 1993, and to the NASD, whose share in NYSE listed stocks increased
from 2.4% in 1976 to 9.63% in 1993. Id. 1976 Statistics. 1993 statistics from NYSE FACT BOOK, supra
note 27, at 8. See also James E. Shapiro, U.S. Equity Markets: A View of Recent Competitive
Developments, NYSE Working Paper No. 93-02, 1 (Nov. 17, 1993) (discussing NYSE's share loss to
regionals).
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For the same reason, the PTSs often favor the regionals for execution of their
trades, which are often matched within the system before transfer to the floor.
The potential for increased market fragmentation that results has been met with
concern by both academics and the regulators.8
As the dominance of the NYSE has been challenged by other markets, the
NYSE has moved to preserve itself in several ways. First, it has vigorously
defended its remaining anti-competitive rules, such as restrictions on member
off-board trading activity."2 Second, the NYSE has made several adaptations
to match the services offered by its competitor markets. These efforts include
development of the "upstairs" or "off-board" market where institutional
investors can negotiate large block trades without exposing them to the
market, 3 and the addition of two after-hours crossing sessions to stem the
flow of after-hours transactions to the international markets or PTSs.
Perhaps the NYSE's most fundamental change has been the partial
automation of its functions through the addition of its Designated Order
Turnaround (DOT) system that offers members the ability to execute or route
orders to the specialist posts without the time-consuming process of using slips
of paper carried by their floor brokers.s' The DOT experienced a significant
81. Order Execution Obligations, supra note 8, at 52,792-93; MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study
1H, at 111-2 (discussing potential problems from fragmentation); Peake & Mendelson, supra note 3, at
20-23 (discussing potential costs of fragmentation). But see Lawrence Harris, Consolidation,
Fragmentation, Segmentation & Regulation 6-25 (March 1992) (available in SEC Public Ref. Room,
File No. 57-18-92) (questioning costs of fragmentation).
82. NYSE Rule 390 prohibits members from making markets in listed securities to compete with
the NYSE specialists. Members can execute trades with other competing market makers. Competing
market makers can only make markets in securities listed on the NYSE after April 26, 1979. Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 55, at 2592.
83. After a price agreement is reached in the "upstairs" market, the trade is then sent to the
designated floor specialist, who exposes it to market orders or the limit order book at the negotiated
price. Many institutions still prefer to route their block trading through the regional exchanges, who will
allow the negotiated block transaction to be executed without exposure to the limit order book. The
amount of block trading on the NYSE has increased dramatically. In 1975, 16.6% of trading on the
NYSE was in blocks, but by 1993, 50% of NYSE trading was in these blocks. MARKET 2000, supra
note 5, Study U], at 1-7. A recent study, however, has indicated that only 27% of block trading occurs
in the upstairs market, with the rest being transacted on the floor. See Cheng & Madhavan, supra note
6. This "upstairs" market has impact on the potential popularity of PTSs, most of which offer both
anonymity and avoidance of market impact. Note that the SEC's recent rule proposal, which will be
discussed in greater detail below, would change both the ability of investors to "hide" trading interest
in the PTSs and would change the rules regarding the display of limit orders. Order Execution
Obligations, supra note 8, at 52,794.
84. Craig Torres et al., Big Board Mulls Early Start, Begins Late Hours, WALL ST. J., June 14,
1991, at CI (announcing opening of new NYSE trading sessions and noting their similarity to Instinet's
and POSIT's after-hours sessions). The NYSE has recently argued that if the PTSs are to be free from
regulatory restraints during their early development, then these exchange associated systems which
compete with them should get a similar regulatory exemption (such as more flexible rule change
procedures) which would allow them to innovate free from regulatory restraints. See, e.g., 1993 House
Hearings, supra note 9.
85. William Power, Bicentennial Battle: Big Board, atAge 200, Scrambles to Protect Grip on Stock
Market, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1992, at Al (describing DOT and noting that SuperDOT, the newer
faster version of the system, facilitates program trading, which depends on high speed execution).
Evidence of destabilizing computer error during program trading concerns commentators and has been
cited as an example of why the stock markets are not ready for full automation.
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operational failure during the 1987 Market Break, after which members were
asked to curtail use of the system for program trading. 6 Since that time, the
NYSE has enhanced and strengthened it.a7
Like the NYSE, the regional markets have also modernized their services
by developing automated routing and execution systems for smaller orders.
88
One regional, the CSE, has eliminated its trading floor entirely and replaced
it with an entirely computerized automated system, which makes it strikingly
similar to the proprietary trading systems.89 NASDAQ has also tried to
increase efficiency through the introduction of computerization with its
SelectNet program." ° By using NASDAQ's SelectNet, users can avoid time
consuming telephone conversations, and can enter buy or sell orders for
execution directly into their computer terminals. SelectNet, however, is
available only to dealers, a fact that annoys some institutional investors.91
II. PROPRIETARY TRADING SYSTEMS 92
The rising popularity of PTSs is dramatic evidence of the invasion of
computer technology. Although these systems currently account for a relatively
small percentage of the total markets, 1.4% of NYSE and 13% of
86. 1987 MARKET BREAK REPORT, supra note 78. Markets offering options trading also have
automatic routing systems, such as the CBOE's Retail Automatic Execution System (RAES), which also
experienced substantial problems during the 1987 Crash. Id. at 8-9.
87. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 55, at 2555.
88. These systems include: Amex's Post Execution Reporting system (PER), the PSE's SCOREX,
Phlx's PACE, BSE's BEACON, and CSE's National Securities Trading System (NSTS). For a more
complete discussion of these systems, see LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 55, at 2556-58.
89. See Gerald T. Nowak, Note, A Failure of Communication: An Argument for the Closing of the
NYSE Floor, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 485, 507 (1993).
90. The NASD, like the NYSE, has attempted to keep pace with the technological revolution by
adding some automated execution features. NASDAQ's Small Order Execution System (SOES) allows
brokers to enter small orders (200, 500, or 1,000 share orders) which are automatically executed at the
"inside" price. Prior to the 1987 Market Break participation in SOES was voluntary, and brokers could
choose whether to execute a small order through SOES, traditional telephone trading, or by sending it
to a PTS. However, the failure of SOES during the October crash led the NASD to make participation
mandatory for market makers in NASDAQ/NMS stocks. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 55, at 2589-91.
NASDAQ also offers SelectNet, an automated trading system that allows broker-dealers to enter orders
and then negotiate the price of execution through counter-offers entered into computer terminals,
replacing the traditional telephone negotiation. SelectNet orders do not automatically appear on all
NASDAQ terminals, thus allowing broker-dealers entering orders to limit the audience for display.
SelectNet allows NASDAQ broker-dealers to negotiate orders inside the spread. MARKET 2000, supra
note 5, Study IV, at IV-7. As will be seen from the description of PTSs below, SelectNet provides a
service substantially similar to that offered by Instinct and other PTSs. Its operation has also raised
similar regulatory concerns, such as transparency effects and fair access limitations. Id. at IV-8. Unlike
its recommendations regarding PTSs, however, the Market 2000 Report suggested that SelectNet be
more highly regulated regarding access and wider quote distribution. Id.
91. Taylor, supra note 31. The NASD has recently proposed a rule change that would allow wider
viewing (although not trading) access to SelectNet. Notice of Amendment No. 2 to Proposed Rule
Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Relating to Non-member Viewing
Access to SelectNet, Exchange Act Release No. 35,428, 60 Fed. Reg. 12,583 (Mar. 7, 1995).
92. The descriptions of categories, as well as the descriptions of the individual PTSs, are derived
from information found in MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. IV.
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NASDAQ/NMS trading volume in 1993, 93 their recent explosive growth, and
their future potential, make them a real issue for both market users and
regulators. In 1991, 2.9 billion shares traded though PTSs, but in only the first
six months of 1993, that number had jumped to 4.7 billion shares.' A vast
majority of that trading, 87%, is in NASDAQ-listed issues where use of PTSs
avoids paying dealer spreads and may allow users to take advantage of the
interquote prices currently unavailable on NASDAQ. 91 Investor participation
in PTSs is particularly high, with TIAA-CREF, for example, recently reporting
that it routes almost 75% of its orders through these systems.' Institutional
investors are drawn to these systems because they offer both anonymity and
lower commission costs without the technical hassle of fourth market
trading.9' They are particularly attractive to passive investors, such as funds
managed by indexing, who do not need the continuous trading offered by the
traditional exchanges. 9 Investors trading in NASDAQ stocks may also be
able to use the systems to avoid paying the dealer spreads. In addition, many
PTSs specialize in certain investment products for which alternative trading is
not readily available, making them more versatile than the traditional
exchanges. 99 This introduction of technology into the financial markets in
general and the securities market specifically-a phenomenon that includes the
development of PTSs-has created challenges for regulators."
93. Id. at AIV-2.
94. Id. at AIV-1. Recent numbers from the NYSE indicate that the 1994 volume in PTSs was over
6 billion shares (unpublished NYSE document on file with author). Note that all volume numbers
concerning PTS trading come from the systems themselves and, to the extent that these numbers are
derived primarily from advertising materials, may be somewhat inaccurate. The SEC recently
promulgated Rule 17a-23, aimed at providing the SEC with more accurate information regarding the
trading volume in these systems.
95. Id. at AIV-1.
96. Burr, supra note 75, at 25.
97. See Gary Weiss, Nightmare on Wall Street: A New Rule Book, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 12, 1992, at
96 (discussing reaction to announcement of Market 2000 Study and noting the institutional investors'
support for PTSs); see also TIAA-CREF Letter, supra note 22; CALPERS Letter, supra note 22.
98. Note, however, that as money managers are more carefully scrutinized by outside consultants,
their willingness to undertake the risk of a negative market effect on any trading decision that causes
a delayed execution of the trade may be reduced and thus may make them more reluctant to turn to the
less liquid PTSs, where execution is not guaranteed.
99. The SEC is concerned about the potential for PTSs to offer trading in instruments for which
there is no other market, or in restricted securities for which special fraud concerns may exist.
Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements for Trading Systems Operated by Brokers and Dealers,
Exchange Act Release No. 33,605, 59 Fed. Reg. 8368 (Feb. 18, 1994) [hereinafter Rule 17a-23
Proposal Release]. For instance, Instinet currently offers trading in 144A securities, which, the SEC
notes, could potentially create problems because trading interests are broadcast to an unknown audience,
which may violate Rule 144A requirements. Id. at 8371 (discussing potential problems with 144A
trading); Letter from Charles R. Hood, Senior Vice President, Instinet to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
SEC 4 n.8 (Oct. 19, 1992) (available in SEC Public Reference Room File No. 57-18-92) (noting that
Instinet offers trading in 144A securities). Note that this also has structural implications to the extent
the traditional exchanges cannot compete with the PTSs for trading these instruments.
100. See TECHNOLOGY AND THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS (Anthony Saunders &
Lawrence J. White eds., 1986) (discussing impact of technology on regulation of financial markets in
general, including securities, futures, and banking industries).
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A. Major 7pes of Proprietary Trading Systems
Currently, the SEC has approved 21 PTSs,101 primarily in no-action
letters. " Of these, only ten are presently active, seven of which trade equity
issues.1"3 The SEC has divided PTSs into four major categories: hit and take
systems; matching systems; auction based systems; and internal order routing
systems. Despite some variations, all of these systems have two characteristics
in common: (1) they limit participation in their systems to professional and
other sophisticated investors; and (2) they are owned and operated by a
registered broker-dealer.
Hit and take systems operate primarily to provide users with an alternate
market for trading in single issues. They offer customers direct access to contra
traders without reliance on an intermediary."o Trading on these systems can
101. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. IV, at AIV-2. These systems include: Cantor Fitzgerald
G.P., Lattice Network, CrossCom Trading Network, Instinct, Instinet's Market Match, LIMITrader,
Franklin Advantage Crossing Network, Exchange Services, Inc., Arizona Stock Exchange (formerly the
Wunsch Auction System), NYSAC, CapitalLink Bond Auction, RMJ Securities/Delta Government
Options, ECON Investment Software, POSIT, POSIT's Volume Weighted Average Pricing Session,
Adler & Co. System, NAPEX, Troster Singer Corp.'s Inside System, Transaction Services, Inc.'s
TRAN System, and B&K Securities Inc.'s COPS System. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. IV, at
AIV-2 to AIV-13. Of those 21 approved systems, only ten are presently active, seven of which trade
equity issues. For further information regarding the active systems, see the following no-action letters
and releases: Instinet Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, [1989 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,997, at 78,920 (Aug. 6, 1986) [hereinafter Instinet No-Action Letter]; The Lattice Network,
1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 976 (Sept. 9, 1993); Cantor Fitzgerald, G.P., 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1248 (Oct. 1, 1993); CrossCom Trading Network, 1992 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1065 (Nov. 24, 1992);
RMJ Securities, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 21 (Jan. 12, 1989); Delta Government Options Corp., Order
Granting Temporary Registration as a Clearing Agency, Exchange Act Release No. 27611, 55 Fed. Reg.
1890, at 1891 (Jan. 19, 1990) [hereinafter Delta Release]; Jefferies & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1987 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,515, at 77,656 (July 28, 1987) [hereinafter
POSIT No-Action Letter]; Instinet Corporation, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 628 (Dec. 6, 1991)
(regarding Instinet's Market Match System); Portfolio System for Institutional Trading, 1991 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 1405 (Oct. 28, 1991) (regarding POSIT's VWAP system); NAPEX Financial Corp., 1986
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2640 (Aug. 18, 1986); National Parmership Exchange, Inc., 1985 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2500 (Sept. 1, 1985); Wunsch Auction Systems, Order Granting Limited Volume Exemption
from Registration as an Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 28,899, 56 Fed. Reg. 8377 (Feb. 28,
1991) [hereinafter Wunsch Release].
102. The issuance of "no-action letters" is an informal process by which the SEC responds to
individual inquiries regarding certain specific actions the individual wishes to undertake. The individual
participant is seeking an assurance from the SEC that it will take no enforcement action if the participant
undertakes the described activities. The opinion expressed in no-action letters is not binding on either
private parties or the SEC itself, which reserves the right to change its opinion. Cox, supra note 4, at
22-24.
103. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. IV, at AIV-2.
104. Customers generally access the systems from their desktops with a modem and a PC. Instinct
also has terminals located on the floors of the AMEX and the regional exchanges where brokers can
enter or match orders. Id. at AIV-3.
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usually take place throughout the trading day, and sometimes after hours,"°5
making them attractive to "active" investors."° The most popular of these
systems is Instinet. Others include the Lattice Trading Network, Cantor
Fitzgerald, 1"o Crosscom Trading Network,08 and Delta Government Op-
tions System. 3 9 They are generally owned and operated by a single broker-
dealer, who executes and arranges for the clearing of most trades completed
through the system, 10 and provides the regulatory interface for SEC over-
sight of the systems. These broker-dealers are generally not members of the
NYSE, but rather operate through memberships with the regional exchang-
es."'
Customers"' use these systems by anonymously entering either limit
orders or "indications of interest." Once the orders are entered into the system,
they are either executed against orders already sitting in the system, or
displayed on the screens of other customer's terminals, who can then choose
105. Instinet operates an after-hours "Crossing Network" where trades are executed based on
closing prices on the primary exchange, and a pre-opening "Market Match" where investors can enter
orders which are executed at volume-weighted average prices. Id. at AIV-9. Unlike Instinet's other
services, which are "interactive" and are at least arguably "discovering" prices independently of the
NYSE as the supply and demand interacts within the system, the after-hours trading sessions derive their
pricing directly from the NYSE.
106. Unlike "passive" investors, who make trading decisions based on liquidity needs and indexing
and portfolio risk strategies, "active" investors make trading decisions based on information such as
market announcements, stock price changes, and other direct criteria that changes throughout the trading
day. Thus, "active" investors will prefer trading systems that allow them to trade at any time that a
relevant announcement or other event with market significance takes place. See, e.g., 1993 House
Hearings, supra note 9, at 463 (prepared statement of Michael 0. Sanderson, President, Instinct Corp.);
TIAA-CREF Letter, supra note 22, at 3; CALPERS Letter, supra note 22, at 1.
107. Cantor Fitzgerald deals only in Limited Partnership interests. Cantor Fitzgerald clears all
orders before they are entered into the system to ensure that they have the necessary documentation.
MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. IV, at AIV-5.
108. CrossCom is used only for trading debt securities. Id. at AIV-6.
109. Delta offers trading only in options on U.S. Treasury bills, notes, and bonds. It is a joint
venture between Delta, a registered clearing agency, RMJ Options Trading Corporation, a registered
government securities broker, and Security Pacific National Trust Company. Id. at AIV-7.
110. See Instinet No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,920. CS First Boston's Lattice Network,
rather than forcing all trades through its affiliated broker-dealer allows customers to route orders to their
choice of several different brokers for execution. MARKET 2000, supra note 5. app. IV, at AIV-4.
111. Instinct, for example, is a member of several regional exchanges. Id. at AIV-3. Lattice
executes some of its trades through electronic links to the exchanges through the NYSE's DOT system
and the BSE's BEACON. Id. at AIV-5. Until recently, Instinct terminals were located at all specialist
posts on the floor of the NYSE, where specialists could use them to enhance their ability to work orders.
The NYSE has recently completely replaced the computer hardware on the specialists posts and, in the
process, has eliminated the Instinet terminals.
112. All of these systems carefully choose their customers based on sophistication and
creditworthiness. Id. at AIV-2 to AIV-7; Instinct No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,931-32; Delta
Release, supra note 101, at 1891. Participation is often limited to broker-dealers, banking institutions,
or other professional financial intermediaries. Instinct No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,925. This
limitation has been the subject of both an argument against greater regulatory scrutiny and has also been
criticized by representatives of smaller investors who have been denied access to the advantages of these
systems. See, e.g., Order Execution Obligations, supra note 8, at 52,792-93 (discussing problem of lack
of access for retail investors).
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to enter a corresponding contra order." 3 Institutions entering orders have the
option of having them displayed only to other institutional investors, thus
prohibiting broker-dealers from seeing their trading interest. This is known as
the "I-only" option. This feature allows institutions to keep the information
communicated by their trading interest from the broker-dealers." 4 Orders
matched with a contra side order are either executed automatically or by an
intermediary through one of several methods, including telephone confirmation
or automatic keystroke." 5 In some cases, matched orders are executed by the
affiliated broker-dealer automatically, without any subsequent activity on the
part of either buyer or seller." 6
Unlike the hit and take systems, matching systems are "passive" pricing
systems, which match orders based on the prices in the primary market for the
security. The matches take place at certain pre-designated times. Customers
enter bids up until a few minutes before the match time, at which point all
matched orders are executed'17 at a price derived from the primary market
price."' Orders not executed at the matching session are cancelled or, at the
option of the customer, can be routed to the primary exchange for market
execution." 9 These systems offer lower commissions in exchange for the loss
of immediacy found in a continuous trading environment. They appeal to
managers who are making investment decisions based on indexing, and who
are seeking anonymous trading and lower transaction costs. Like the hit and
take systems, these systems are owned and operated by registered broker-
dealers who are responsible for regulatory compliance. The most popular of
these systems is the Portfolio System for Institutional Trading (POSIT), which
operates during the normal trading day and allows investors to trade both
113. Customers using the Lattice Network not only can route orders to be matched against orders
in the Lattice system but can also choose to route orders to a participating exchange for market
execution. They may also instruct the system to find the "best" execution whether it be in the network
or on an exchange. Orders that do not find matches can be left with either Lattice or an exchange.
MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. IV, at AIV-4.
114. For a description of Instinet's "I-only" function, see id. at AIV-3. In contrast, broker-dealers
do have access to information regarding trading interest in the NYSE's "upstairs" market and, despite
NYSE rules prohibiting the practice, have frequently been accused of "front-running," whereby floor
brokers associated with upstairs trading desks are informed of impending trades and are able to enter
into floor trades prior to the display of the upstairs cross. See, e.g., David M. Bovi, Rule lOb-5 Liability
for Front-Running: Adding a New Dimension to the "Money Game", 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 102, 103
(1994); 1993 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 488 (prepared statement of Raymond L. Killian, Jr.,
President, ITG, Inc).
115. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. IV, at AIV-2. "Indications of interest" are not firm
bids/asks, but instead are firm only as to price or size. An example is Instinet's "Negotiation Service,"
where the indications of interest are used as the starting point for a negotiation that takes place
anonymously through the system and can be limited with an "I-only" designation. Id. at AIV-3.
116. For example, Instinet's "Trading Service," which offers automatic execution. Id.
117. In the POSIT system, a POSIT employee looks at all matched orders and decides whether to
execute it automatically or, in the event that the match is not perfect, contact the parties for
modifications. Id. at AIV-8.
118. POSIT executes orders at the midpoint between the best bid/ask on the primary market on the
day of the trade. Id.
119. Id. at AIV-8.
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complete portfolios and single issues of stock. 2 Other matching systems also
operate in after-hours trading, such as POSIT's pre-opening Volume Weighted
Average Price session and Instinet's Market Match.' 2'
Auction systems can be either "single-price" (where the system determines
an equilibrium price based on supply and demand) or "one-sided" (where the
system mathematically determines the highest price for a security in the system
and executes between highest bidder and seller). The largest and most
successful of these systems is the Arizona Stock Exchange (AZX), 22 which
is a "single price," non-continuous auction system.'23 AZX participation is
limited to broker-dealers and institutional investors. Users are connected
through computer linkages to AZX's main computer, which runs an auction
once a day at 5:00 p.m. (EST) after the close of the NYSE and NASDAQ.
Participants enter limit orders throughout the day until a pre-established
deadline a few seconds before the daily auction. The computer then reviews all
orders in the system to determine the equilibrium price, which is the price
where the volume of buy orders most nearly equals the volume of sell orders
(the Auction Price).' 24 All orders exceeding the equilibrium price are then
automatically executed at the Auction Price. All orders equal to the Auction
Price are filled on the basis of time priority.'25
120. POSIT is a trading system that is owned and operated by Investment Technology Group, Inc.
(ITGI), a NASDAQ listed subsidiary of Jefferies & Company. In May, 1994, ITG and Jefferies
transferred the POSIT business to Investment Technology Group, Inc., which then went public with an
initial public offering of 3.7 million shares of common stock. Jefferies immediately became the
controlling shareholder of ITG, with over an 80% ownership interest as of December, 1994.
INVESTMENT TECHNOLOGY GROUP, INC., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS 24 (1995)
[hereinafter ITGI ANNUAL REPORT]. In addition to POSIT, ITGI offers QuantEX, which is a portfolio
management program that helps institutions maximize portfolio returns. QuantEX offers routing services,
which allow users to send trades to POSIT, the NYSE, a regional exchange, or an OTC market maker.
ITGI derives almost all of its revenue from POSIT and QuantEX. INVESTMENT TECHNOLOGY GROUP,
INC., FORM 10-K FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1995 at 3 (Mar. 27, 1995) [hereinafter ITGI
FORM 10-K].
121. POSIT's Volume Weighted Average Pricing System bases prices on the total volume in the
primary market (for exchange-listed securities) or total NASDAQ volume (for NASDAQ/NMS
securities). MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. IV, at AIV-9 to AIV-10. Instinet's Market Match uses
the total consolidated tape volume for listed securities, a pricing option also available to POSIT users.
Id. at AIV-9 to AIV-10.
122. AZX was originally located in Minnesota and known as the "Wunsch Auction Systems,"
under which it received its no-action approval. It moved to Arizona after receiving a $2 million
investment from the state in 1992. Arizona Exchange Unveiled This Week, SECURITIES WEEK, Mar. 23,
1992, at 10.
123. The other of these systems is the National Partnership Exchange (NAPEX) which is a one-
sided auction which facilitates trading only in limited partnerships.
124. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. IV, at AIV-10 to AIV-1 1. AZX's founder, Steven Wunsch,
has repeatedly emphasized that AZX is not a "passive" pricing system, but rather discovers its own
prices. Nonetheless, in practice, 90% of AZX trades are executed at NYSE prices. Burr, supra note 75,
at 25.
125. Throughout the day, the computer constantly determines the equilibrium price of the orders
currently in the system and displays it to users, who can then adjust their orders to increase their
chances of execution. Since its original inception in 1991, the AZX has added a "Match Book" which
allows customers with prematched orders that do not meet the "Auction Price" to route orders to BT
Brokerage for execution. The no-action letter noted that any volume routed to BT Brokerage in this
manner must be included in the total volume for determining AZX's continuing volume exemption.
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Since their original entry into securities trading, the PTSs have begun to
expand internationally, include new investment products, and consolidate the
strengths of different systems. Instinet is particularly popular because of its
links to international markets and its affiliation with foreign broker-dealers who
are members of the London, Frankfurt, Paris, and Toronto Stock Exchang-
es. 126 This popularity has led other PTSs to seek international ventures. 27
Links between the various PTSs allow the consolidation of orders and makes
the systems more attractive by increasing liquidity and decreasing costs for
users. AZX and POSIT, for example, have recently announced an alliance
whereby POSIT customers will have the option of routing unmatched orders
to AZX to be included in its 5:00 p.m. call auction session. 28
B. PTSs and Fragmentation'29
The development of a wide variety of markets, slowly pulling volume away
from the centralized NYSE, is referred to as "market fragmentation." As
Wunsch Release, supra note 101.
126. In addition, it can effect trades in numerous foreign issues. As with the NYSE, Instinet has
terminals located on foreign exchange floors; however, pursuant to U.S. law, trading directly between
foreign and U.S. investors is limited. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. IV, at AIV-3.
127. AZX's founder, Steven Wunsch, has recently made overtures in international markets and may
be looking to establish international links. Karen Corcella, Packing Proprietary Systems for Overseas,
WALL ST. & TECH., Apr. 1, 1994, at 14. POSIT has also begun searching for expansion opportunities
in the global market. ITGI ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 120, at 7.
128. Press Release from the Investment Technology Group, Inc., Investment Technology Group,
Inc. Announces New Technology Alliance and Clearing Agreement with AZX, Inc. (Feb. 9, 1995)
[hereinafter ITGI Press Release]. Under the terms of the alliance, ITG will also become the executing
broker for all matches done in AZX. This arrangement will reduce the impact of one of POSIT's
drawbacks, which is that execution is not guaranteed and thus participants bear the market risk of
allowing orders to sit in POSIT's system for a day. An order entered in POSIT cannot simultaneously
be worked on the exchange floor or sent to a NASDAQ broker. Thus, participants choosing to place
the order in the POSIT system, rather than sending it to their floor broker, run the risk that their order
will not be executed in POSIT and that the floor price will move in an adverse direction during the day.
When the customer is finally able to retrieve the order from POSIT and send it to the floor, it will be
executed at the inferior price. In addition, customers will only have to pay one commission fee for the
use of both systems, increasing incentives to use the POSIT/AZX system.
129. The term "fragmentation" is used to refer to several different phenomena. "Market
fragmentation" usually refers to the splintering of markets that are physically separated. Fragmentation,
however, can also occur over time. In a continuous market, demand and supply are not consolidated at
a single point in time and thus may be "fragmented." A call auction, like the AZX, brings together
supply and demand at a certain time, thus eliminating this temporal fragmentation. As one commentator
has noted, call markets are "particularly suitable for computerization. . .. When computer technology
has been applied to the continuous market, on the other hand, it has served largely to accelerate the pace
with which orders are submitted to the market and translated into trades. Under stressful conditions, this
acceleration may be destabilizing." Schwartz, supra note 21, at 390-91. Like physical fragmentation,
temporal fragmentation has the potential for both good and harmful effects on the functioning of
markets. The most frequently cited problem with temporal fragmentation is its contribution to the intra-
day price volatility present in the continuous auction markets such as the NYSE. See, e.g., Peake &
Mendelson, supra note 3, at 18. These commentators note, however, that temporal fragmentation
facilitates capital flow to volatile industries whose investors demand intra-day liquidity. In addition to
"spatial" and "temporal" fragmentation, Peake and Mendelson have identified a third source of
"fragmentation," which they call "internal" fragmentation. This occurs when bids and offers within the
same market cannot trade with each other, such as when previously matched orders are not exposed to
the limit book or market floor. Id. at 16-17.
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discussed above, several potential problems, including decreased liquidity, less
accurate price discovery, less effective best execution monitoring, and
diminished transparency, may result from market fragmentation. Critics of
PTSs, particularly the established exchanges, have repeatedly argued that PTSs
heighten market fragmentation and threaten further impact as their market share
grows.
PTSs may also contribute to the separation of the institutional and
individual investor markets, which could have several negative results,
including greater distrust of the markets among individual investors and
increased risk for market makers and specialists, which leads to higher spreads
and, possibly, decreased liquidity. Individual rather than institutional investors
may also bear the burden of the fragmentation problems listed above, because
their lack of market power and information disadvantages them in a less
transparent trading environment which is more difficult to monitor.
There are also benefits, however, from the development of different
markets, such as enhanced customer service and lower commissions. 3 ° New
markets will fail unless they offer either better prices or better service.' If
successful, they put pressure on the existing markets to adapt to meet the
demands of the investing public for new services or lower prices. Competing
markets also enable investors to choose a package with trade-offs that may be
unacceptable to other investors. For instance, many of the PTSs, unlike the
NYSE, do not provide the investor with the ability to trade immediately on
new information. Thus, investors who place a premium on immediacy, such
as arbitrageurs, should be willing to pay the extra costs of running a continuous
market.' In contrast, institutional investors with more "passive" investment
strategies can avoid subsidizing the immediacy needs of the arbitrageurs by
moving some of their order flow to PTSs where they can pay lower commis-
sion fees and avoid the market risk costs associated with exposing block
positions to the open market.'33
Market fragmentation may actually increase liquidity because it provides
investors with more points of access to the market, encouraging greater
participation. In addition, market fragmentation may also enhance liquidity by
130. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study I, at rn-1.
131. Hans R. Stoll, Organization of the Stock Market: Competition or Fragmentation?, in
MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIvES 399 (Kenneth
Lehn & Robert M. Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1992).
132. The commissions charged by NYSE members or the bid-ask spreads earned by market-makers
in the NASDAQ market are the price of this access to continuous trading. In addition, the provision of
immediacy contributes to the temporal (rather than the physical) fragmentation of markets, creating
another "cost" of the service. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 389-90.
133. A similar trade-off is made for sophisticated investors, who may be more willing to bear the
risks of trading in a less regulated market where they gain the advantage of lower transaction costs but
lose protection from fraudulent practices. Their superior knowledge and greater market power make
them more comfortable with this practice than the individual investors who rely on the "insurance"
provided by the regulatory authorities. Nowak, supra note 89, at 514.
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attracting market makers who are more willing to put capital at risk in a
trading environment where they can earn a larger spread, as well as by
discouraging institutional investors from leaving the structured market
altogether, for example, to the fourth market. Finally, the idea underlying the
NMS legislation and the development of the ITS was that the different markets
could be linked, thus eliminating any fragmentation problems represented by
the spatial separation of the markets, by routing orders over the computer links
to the market offering the best price.'34 Critics of PTSs have argued that they
undermine NMS goals by encouraging the diversion of order flow from the
primary markets through new market centers that are not completely
transparent. 35
Eliminating the price differential, however, can be performed by
arbitrageurs without the physical linkage between the markets. Any price
differential between markets will be eliminated by the arbitrageurs, who will
purchase and sell in the unequal markets until the price equalizes between
them. As long as the markets are completely transparent and the arbitrageurs
are allowed to freely operate, the arbitrage activity will be able essentially to
link the markets, and different market centers can exist without hampering
either liquidity or price discovery.'36 While this method of market linkage
does bear the "cost" of the premium earned by the arbitragers, physical linkage
through the ITS is also an expensive proposition.
The PTSs argue that instead of fragmenting the market, they actually help
centralize it by facilitating this non-physical market linkage. By computerizing
the display of quotes in various markets and providing users with rapid
keystroke routing to various market centers, they increase the arbitrageurs'
abilities both to see prices in other markets and to execute trades quickly in the
market with the variant price. 117
134. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. H1, at H-4.
135. Id., app. VI, at AVI-35 to AVI-37 (summarizing various comments concerning PTSs' potential
impact on fragmentation).
136. See, e.g., Letter from Frank E. Baxter, Chairman, President & CEO, Jefferies & Co., Inc.
and Raymond L. Killian, Jr., President, Investment Technology Group, Inc. to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, SEC 23 (Oct. 8, 1992) (available in the SEC Public Reference Room, File No. S7-18-92)
[hereinafter POSIT Comment Letter] (noting that fragmentation is only a problem if there is limited or
no arbitrage activity); MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. VI, at AVI-33 (summarizing comments
regarding PTSs and fragmentation); Harris, supra note 81, at 17-18 (discussing role of arbitragers in
linking markets). Fragmented markets that are "linked" through transparency are sometimes referred
to as "segmented" markets which, proponents argue, allow traders with different trading needs to choose
the package that suits them while still maintaining the integrity and liquidity of the markets. Id. at 16.
137. See, e.g., 1993 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 469-70 (prepared statement of Michael 0.
Sanderson, President, Instinct Corp.); POSIT Comment Letter, supra note 136, at 20-21. For instance,
the Instinct system provides users with screens that simultaneously display quotes in a variety of market
centers on one side of the screen and displays the Instinct order book on the other side of the screen.
Instinct No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,920-21. Thus, Instinct users essentially fill the
arbitrageurs' role in equalizing the markets. Similarly, POSIT's new QuanTEX system displays quotes
in several markets, including both traditional markets and PTSs, and allows orders to be routed.among
them. PTSs do, however, also decrease pre-trade transparency because they allow some orders to be
hidden from.interested contra-parties. This latter problem seems to be one of the SEC's concerns that
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C. PMSs and SRO Competition
Market fragmentation, by allowing markets to exist separately, also allows
them to be regulated separately. The existing exchanges and the NASD have
been vocal participants in the PTS debate, contending that PTSs can focus on
competitive efforts to divert flow from the exchanges because they are free
from the regulatory burdens and responsibilities facing the SROs. The
exchanges argue that PTSs "free ride" off their provision of certain necessary
services, which include mechanisms for price discovery and the general
insurance of the integrity of the trading markets.
In the current structure, price discovery happens primarily on the floor of
the NYSE which, in conjunction with the CTA, generates the acknowledged
market price for all listed securities. The NYSE often refers to the importance
of accurate pricing as generated on the floor of the NYSE.'38 The NYSE, and
the other exchanges that must report to the Tape, bear the costs of running this
system.'39 Many of the PTSs or other off-exchange trading environments are
"passive" pricing systems, which either price directly off the NYSE, 4° or
use NYSE prices as the starting point for negotiations.' 4 ' The PTSs benefit
from this information but do not have to pay for it, either directly, or indirectly
through the regulatory costs imposed on the NYSE. 4 z PTSs also pull order
flow away from the NYSE, and in the process, perpetuate inaccurate price
discovery by reducing flow through the market that is providing the price
discovery.'43
In addition to providing price discovery, the NYSE and the other exchanges
also argue that the regulatory burdens they bear assist all market participants
by reassuring the investing public about the integrity of the markets. 44 The
NYSE acts as the "market of last resort" in times of crisis; investors turn to
the NYSE to continue providing liquidity, and the NYSE rules, which force
floor specialists to cover supply and demand gaps, particularly during crises,
is motivating recent rule proposals. Order Execution Obligations, supra note 8, at 52,792-93.
138. 1993 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 3 (prepared statement of William H. Donaldson,
Chairman, NYSE).
139. NASD market-makers are required to report trades to the Tape within 90 seconds. A recent
study, however, questions whether the market-makers are diligent in actually reporting to the Tape
within the specified time period. Warren Getler, NASDAQ Dealers Often Violate Rules On Speedy
Reporting, Study Suggests, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1995, at A10 (discussing unpublished study by
Weaver and Porter indicating that NASDAQ market-makers are violating "90-second rule," which may
distort accuracy of public pricing).
140. For instance, Instinet's Crossing Session and Market Match generate prices directly from
NYSE closing prices and volume. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study 11, at 11-8.
141. Id. For instance, the NYSE "upstairs" market; see also id., Study m, at 11I-2 (discussing price
discovery on primary exchange).
142. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. VI, at AVI-36 (summarizing NYSE comments).
143. 1993 House Hearings, supra note 9. at 339 (testimony of Richard A. Grasso, President,
NYSE) (discussing impact of order diversion on pricing mechanism).
144. Id., Study I11, at 111-3.
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are of crucial importance to the continuing viability of the markets. 45 The
NYSE and the other exchanges, perhaps acting in their role as competitors
rather than regulators, have used these arguments to advocate increased
regulatory burdens on the PTSs, or in the alternative, decreased burdens for
themselves. '
While the SEC has been sympathetic to some of these arguments,' 4 7 it has
also pointed out that the NYSE is able to charge fees for access to the
Consolidated Tape information, for example, and membership dues that allow
it to recoup some costs.' 48 The NYSE's continued ability to remain profitable
may indicate that it is not suffering dramatically from this problem. 49 The
role of the traditional exchanges and NASDAQ in this debate highlights the
tension between the SROs' dual role as regulator and competitor. The
proliferation of PTSs has illuminated this tension in a unique way. All PTSs
are owned and operated by broker-dealers who are subject to the oversight of
the NASD; the NASD is both the regulator of the PTSs and one of its fiercest
competitors. In undertaking both roles, the NASD might be tempted to thwart
the growth of PTSs through regulatory action.' 0
III. THE REGULATION OF PROPRIETARY TRADING SYSTEMS
The basic regulatory regime for the primary, regional, and NASDAQ
markets was determined by the 1934 Act, with some changes wrought by the
1975 Amendments. As noted above, the SEC has focused its approach to
regulation primarily on the prevention of fraud, with less attention given to
regulation aimed at developing market structure, an approach that has left the
145. During the most critical periods of the 1987 crash, the NASD experienced even greater
difficulties than the NYSE (which was assisted by its specialists) and was unable to continue operating,
as the market-makers that create the system stopped answering their phones or executing trades. 1987
MARKET BREAK REPORT, supra note 78, at 9-19. The PTSs have argued that the floor specialists are
a band-aid for the imperfect market flow that has been created by overregulation and the monopolistic
rules imposed by the NYSE. Instinet No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,935-36.
146. See, e.g., 1993 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 435 (prepared testimony of Edward A.
Kwalwasser, Executive Vice President, NYSE).
147. The new reporting requirements imposed on the PTSs, as discussed in more detail below, are
an effort on the part of the SEC to address some of these concerns.
148. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study Il, at 111-3.
149. Id. While the NYSE's current health is not in jeopardy, its long-term future may be a bigger
concern. See, e.g., Roger Lowenstein and Craig Torres, Big Board Stocks May Be Rising, But Exchange
Seat Prices Languish, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1990, at Cl (noting that price for seat on the exchange
had dropped from $1.15 million in 1987 to $430,000 in 1990 and attributing drop to emergence of
PTSs).
150. For instance, NASDAQ has recently introduced its new Aqcess trading system. See Taylor
and Getler, supra note 41, for a discussion of the new system. Under this system, the NASD will
require participating broker-dealers to provide price protection for limit orders in the system. In a
possible effort to level the regulatory playing field, the NASD will also require that all PTSs provide
the same price protection for limit orders. Note, however, that the NASD has supported the
development of PTSs, so long as they are adequately regulated. Letter from Joseph R. Hardiman,
President, NASD to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, SEC 14-15 (Nov. 20, 1992) (available in the SEC Public
Reference Room, File No. S7-18-92).
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PTS issue unresolved. The SEC has undertaken to regulate certain market
entities both by looking to prevent the fraudulent potential that is unique to
each market participant and by considering the role they play in the system,
rather than their nominal character, an approach that has been termed
"functional regulation." 151
The development of PTSs has presented the SEC with the challenge of
determining the appropriate regulatory regime. The SEC essentially has two
ways it can apply "functional regulation." It can either incorporate PTSs into
the current regulatory regime or it can create a new regulatory category based
on the unique character of these systems. 52 Rather than definitively choosing
either of these approaches, the SEC has dabbled in both. The SEC's initial
reaction to the appearance of PTSs was to create an alternative regulatory
category within the 1934 Act, Rule 15c2-10.15 When that effort proved
unsuccessful,1 4 the SEC retreated to an ad hoc approach developed through
151. The term "functional regulation" as opposed to "institutional regulation" suggests that
entities that perform similar functions should be subject to similar regulation.. . firms that
act solely as intermediaries between a market and a customer should be regulated as brokers;
firms that hold themselves out to other professionals as willing to buy and sell securities on
an order-by-order basis should be regulated as dealers; and firms that establish a market place
for providing executions of transactions in securities pursuant to their own trading rules should
be regulated in a manner similar to exchanges, regardless of whether they are brokers or
dealers.
1993 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 441 (prepared statement of Edward A. Kwalwasser, Executive
Vice President, NYSE).
152. The second of these options would require the SEC to create a separate regulatory structure,
similar to the section 15A alternative regulatory system for non-member brokers and dealers in the 1934
Act or the "clearing agency" concept created in the 1975 Amendments. This new regulatory category
for the PTSs would have to be specifically tailored to their role in the marketplace. Even more radically,
Congress could create a new statutory regime for PTSs, as it did in 1940 with the Investment Company
Act of 1940.
153. The SEC has twice proposed a new Rule 15c2-10 which would have, at least in a weak form,
created a new regulatory category for these systems. See Proposed Rule 15c2-10, Exchange Act Release
No. 8,661 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,735 (Aug. 4, 1969) and
Proprietary Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 26,708 [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,406 (Apr. 11, 1989) (re-proposing Rule 15c2-10). In 1969, the SEC noted that "the
technology that has led to the development of automated trading information systems was not envisioned
when Congress passed the [1934] Act. Consequently, the applicability or adaptability of the existing
statutory classifications to them is not entirely clear." Proposed Rule 15c2-10 at 83,682. Thus, the SEC
proposed Rule 15c2-10 which, "would provide a regulatory framework for systems not within the
existing scope of regulation of exchanges and national securities associations." Id. at 83,683. The new
rule specifically defined the "automated trading information systems" as "any automated system for
transmitting, among participants, subscribers, or customers, indications of interest to purchase or sell
securities or offers to purchase or sell securities through the use of a computer or similar device, but
does not include any such system sponsored, operated, and regulated by a registered national securities
exchange or a registered national securities association." Id. The new rule would have required PTSs
to file a proposed plan with the SEC, which the SEC would then review to ensure that it provided
sufficient measures for preventing fraud and for maintaining the necessary records. Proposed Rule 15c2-
10 was eventually withdrawn in 1975 in the same release that adopted Rule 1 lAb2-1 regarding the
registration of "securities information processors." The SEC simply stated without further explanation
or discussion that the rule was no longer necessary "in view of the regulatory scheme provided by the
1975 Amendments." Notice of Adoption of Rule 1 lAab2-1 and Notice of Withdrawal of Proposed Rule
15c2-10, supra note 56, at 85,687.
154. See Notice of Adoption of Rule 1 lAb2-1 and Withdrawal of Proposed Rule 15c2-10, supra
note 56; Proprietary Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 33,621 [1992-1993 Transfer Binder]
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a series of no-action letters and recently formalized with the adoption of new
Rule 17a-23 in December 1994.155 The SEC has ultimately chosen not to
create a new structure, but rather to compare the PTSs to existing entities, such
as "exchanges" or "broker-dealers. "136
A. Regulation Through Existing Structures
The SEC, through its no-action letters, has attempted to regulate PTSs
within the current framework. The SEC has implemented this approach by
either determining that the PTSs are "brokers" and/or "dealers," and thus
subject to regulation by the SEC and the NASD, or by granting the PTSs a
"limited volume" exception to exchange registration. By adopting this
approach, the SEC, which seems to be driven by both policy and statutory
concerns, has avoided determining whether the new systems are "exchanges,"
which would require them to operate as a new SRO with regulatory responsi-
bilities and SEC oversight.
1. Regulation as Exchanges
Prior to 1969, the SEC had little reason to provide interpretation of the
Act's definition of "exchange," which had not been a particularly challenged
provision of the statute. Some critics have argued that the SEC's failure to
address directly this issue in the early days has led to confusion and contro-
versy over its application ever since.' 57 Section 3(a)(1) defines an "exchange"
as:
any organization, association, or group of persons, whether incorporated or
unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or
facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise
performing with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock
exchange as that term is generally understood, and includes the market place and
the market facilities maintained by such exchange.8
If an entity is determined to be an "exchange," as defined by section 3(a)(1),
it must register as a "national securities exchange" under section 6, which will
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,322 (Feb. 14, 1994) (withdrawing Proposed Rule 15c2-10 in light of the
new Proposed Rule 17a-13 imposing additional record keeping and reporting requirements on PTSs).
155. Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements for Trading Systems Operated by Brokers and
Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 35,124, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,702 (Dec. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Rule
17a-23 Adoption Release].
156. Systems such as Instinct, POSIT, have generally requested a no-action position with respect
to their non-registration as "exchanges" under section 6 of the Act, as "associations" under section 15A
of the Act, or as a "clearing agency" as defined in section 3(a)(23) of the Act. One system, AZX
("Wunsch system"), was given a "limited volume exchange" exemption under section 5 of the Act.
Wunsch Release, supra note 101.
157. Therese H. Maynard, What is an "Exchange?"-Proprietary Electronic Securities Trading
Systems and the Statutory Definition of an Exchange, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 833 (1992).
158. 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(1) (1995).
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subject it to the variety of rules and regulations outlined in that section.'5 9
Because these rules are extensive and costly, the new systems have taken pains
to convince the SEC that they do not fall within the definition.
The controversy regarding the definition of exchange stems primarily from
its facial breadth. As one PTS has noted, the definition is "so broad that, when
read literally, it would appear to embrace ... not only the traditionally
recognized stock exchanges, but also traditional brokers such as the major wire
houses, market makers, block positioners and third-market makers [who] have
offices (places of business) where they make markets and/or cross orders to the
maximum extent possible (i.e. bring together purchasers and sellers). " 160
Assuming that Congress could not have meant the definition to extend this far,
interpreters are faced with the problem of finding a limiting principle which
will allow the SEC to apply the law as it was intended and yet retain its broad
reach.
The SEC itself remained notably reticent as to its interpretation of section
3(a)(1) until 1990 when the Seventh Circuit, reviewing the SEC's decision to
grant a no-action position to the non-registration of the Delta Government
Options trading system, specifically requested that the SEC articulate its
definition of "exchange." 161 In response to this request, the SEC issued a
release in which it determined that, in deciding whether or not a particular
system is an exchange:
the central focus of the Commission's inquiry should be whether the system is
designed, whether through trading rules, operational procedures or business
incentives, to centralize trading and provide buy and sell quotations on a regular or
continuous basis so that purchasers and sellers have a reasonable expectation that
they can regularly execute their orders at those price quotations. 62
The SEC undertook a fairly lengthy discussion of this standard and the factors
that would be considered in applying it, including the presence of a trading
"floor," limit order protection, the use of specialists with affirmative trading
159. Under subsection (a), exchanges must apply for and receive approval from the Commission
prior to commencing operations. The SEC will only give approval after verifying that the exchange
complies which the numerous provisions of subsection (b), including reporting and compliance
procedures, rules for administration and trading, and procedures for disciplinary action against members
who fail to comply with the federal securities laws or the rules of the exchange. Once registered, an
exchange must comply with the membership requirements of subsection (c) and the applicable reporting
requirements and other responsibilities of sections 17 and 19.
160. Instinct No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,930.
161. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 536-37 (7th Cir. 1989). This
litigation arose when the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
both futures exchanges, challenged the non-registration of the Delta System as an "exchange." The Delta
System, which was to facilitate trading of put and call options on government securities, threatened the
plaintiffs, who feared they would lose the hedge driven order flow from their markets. Interestingly,
the court concluded that these exchanges had standing to challenge the SEC's determination because the
federal securities laws could be interpreted to protect both investors and markets and the futures markets
had adequately proven that they could be injured sufficiently to claim standing. Id. at 529-34.
162. Delta Release, supra note 101, at 1900.
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obligations, guaranteed execution, the standardization of instruments traded in
the system, and the participation of retail investors.'63 The SEC concluded
that Delta was not an "exchange" as that term was commonly understood. I"
The SEC initially considered issues such as Delta's ability to establish
admissions criteria, impose rules on participants, and discipline participants but
later dismissed them by noting that "securities clearing agencies" have the
power to undertake many of these same activities, yet were clearly exempt
from the congressional interpretation of "exchange." 1" More interestingly,
the SEC acknowledged the pragmatic policy problems that would result from
attempting to regulate Delta as an exchange, specifically, the regulatory costs
that might drive such a system out of business.66
In articulating the definition of "exchange," the SEC and the Seventh
Circuit left a substantial amount undetermined. In the closing paragraph of its
discussion regarding the "exchange" definition, the SEC noted that "it is
certainly possible that [such] a system.., might attract a level of buying and
selling interest to develop into a continuous or regular auction market." 67
The SEC went on to state that, "if an existing market developed a stock trading
system and accompanied it with trading rules, procedures or business incentives
that resulted or appeared likely to result in a continuous or regular centralized
securities market, that system would be required to register as an ex-
change. "168 This language leaves open the possibility that exchange registra-
tion might be necessary as these systems grow. More fundamentally, this
language seems to indicate that the systems do possess most of the essential
characteristics of an "exchange," but do not currently meet the definition
because of their size. The Seventh Circuit added its own gloss on the problem
by noting that:
What is true is that the Delta system differs only in degree and detail from an
exchange. Its trading floor is a computer's memory. Its structure is designed to
encourage liquidity, though not to the same extent as the structure of an exchange
163. The SEC ultimately determined that Delta did not meet this criteria and was, therefore, not
an "exchange" required to register under the Act. Note that the SEC's list of criteria seems to suffer
from the same problem as the PTSs no-action letter arguments discussed below. Some of the criteria
are not definitional, but rather are related to the propriety of a proposed exchange's operation plan, as
filed with the SEC for pre-approval under section 6(b).
164. The SEC's conclusion with regard to Delta's status was upheld by the Seventh Circuit, which
noted that the SEC's decision not to litigate was one completely within agency discretion. Board of
Trade of the City of Chicago v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1991). At least one commentator has
criticized this deference to the SEC's interpretation of a statute when it conflicts with the "literal
language" of the statute. Maynard, supra note 157, at 839.
165. Delta Release, supra note 101, at 1891.
166. Delta Release, supra note 101, at 1899-900. For instance, it is unclear that institutions could
continue to participate directly in systems that are defined as "exchanges." In adopting the position, the
SEC did not specifically respond to the futures exchanges' argument that requiring registration would
not restrict direct participation by institutional investors.
167. Id. at 1900.
168. Id. at 1900 n.100.
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is. Section 3(a)(1) is broadly worded. No doubt (considering the time when and
circumstances in which it was enacted) this was to give the Securities and Exchange
Commission maximum control over the securities industry. So the Commission
could have interpreted the section to embrace the Delta system. .... But we do not
think it was compelled to do so.16
The PTSs, obviously wishing to construe this definition as narrowly as
possible, have emphasized the congressional reference to "a stock exchange as
that term is generally understood."170 They argue that Congress meant to
encompass within the definition only exchanges that are substantially similar
to the ones that were in existence in 1934, like the NYSE. This definition
requires trading floors, administrative procedures, and defined member-
ships.'71 Instinet buttresses this interpretation by noting that the definition of
"facility"' 72 and the definition of "member" 173 both seem to envision an
"exchange" possessing characteristics similar to that of the NYSE and the other
physically located exchanges. Instinet further notes that if the SEC were to
adopt such a broad meaning of "exchange," it would incorporate the over-the-
counter market, and thus would make the aspect of the 1934 Act aimed
specifically at the separate regulation of the OTC market superfluous. 74
Finally, PTSs argue that they are businesses, not regulators, and thus should
not be classified as "exchanges," the function of which is "primarily regulatory
in nature. Exchanges and associations may (and in today's world do) provide
169. Board of Trade, 923 F.2d at 1273.
170. POSIT No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 77,658; Instinet No-Action Letter, supra note
101, at 78,931.
171. Instinct No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,931. Another PTS has articulated four "basic
qualities" which define an exchange:
a. The presence of members who have a proprietary interest in, and control over, the
exchange;
b. A system of self-regulation of members of an exchange;
c. The exercise of control by the exchange over the selection of securities traded within the
exchange; and
d. The furnishing of physical facilities for the auction trading of securities (typically, a stock
exchange "floor" on which members can communicate in person and conduct a securities
business).
POSIT No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 77,658.
172. A "facility" is the exchange's "premises, tangible or intangible property whether on the
premises or not, any right to the use of such premises or property or any service thereof for the purpose
of effecting or reporting a transaction on an exchange (including, among other things, any system of
communication to or from the exchange, by ticket or otherwise, maintained by or with the consent of
the exchange), and any right of the exchange to the use of any property or service." Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2) (1995).
173. A "member" for purposes of an "exchange" means,
(i) any natural person permitted to effect transactions on the floor of the exchange without the
services of another person acting as broker, (ii) any registered broker or dealer with which
such a natural person is associated, (iii) any registered broker or dealer permitted to designate
as a representative such a natural person, and (iv) any other registered broker or dealer which
agrees to be regulated by such exchange and with respect to which the exchange undertakes
to enforce compliance with the provisions of this title the rules and regulations thereunder, and
its own rules.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 3(a)(3)(A) (1995).
174. Instinct No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,997.
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services and other facilities for members, but that operational role is secondary
to their essential purpose as regulators."17
After defining "exchange" by reference to the "traditional" markets, the
PTSs point out that they do not fall under this definition. First, they claim that
they have "customers" and not "members," noting that customers have no
power to vote or to exercise control over the access of others to the system, as
do exchange members.'76 Second, they point out that they do not have
trading floors where brokers can meet with each other and with the floor
specialist to complete trades."7 Third, they argue that they do not have
disciplinary rules and procedures as do the existing SROs."'7 Fourth, they
note that they do not use the specialist system which grants one individual a
monopoly over the floor market for a particular issue, but instead accept "all
comers" interested in completing transactions through the system. 179 They
argue that such an open playing field, in contrast to a monopoly, inherently
needs less regulation."S
The major weakness in the PTSs' argument is their confusion between
criteria which define them as an "exchange" under section 3(a)(1) of the Act
and criteria which are necessary to make their registration plan effective under
section 6 of the Act. While they may not currently have a set of administrative
rules or disciplinary procedures as do the registered exchanges, this fact is not
relevant to their status as "exchanges." Similarly, the inability of their
"customers" to vote on system or membership policies is also a facet of section
6 registration rather than of the section 3 definition.''
If PTSs fall under the section 3 definition, their "customers" could be
viewed as "members" as defined by the Act. l" In fact, Instinet and POSIT's
customers are able to go to those systems' electronic trading "floors"1 3
175. Id. at 78,929.
176. Id. at 78,931; POSIT No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 77,658.
177. Instinet No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,931; POSIT No-Action Letter, supra note
101, at 77,658.
178. Instinct No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,931; POSIT No-Action Letter supra note 101,
at 77,658.
179. Instinet No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,931.
180. Id. They also argue that specialists are needed on "exchanges" to remedy the market
imperfections that result from the artificial trading barriers the exchanges have constructed (such as off-
exchange trading restrictions and membership limitations). Thus, the PTSs argue, specialists are not
needed in their systems since no such barriers to entry exist. Id. at 78,936.
181. See Maynard, supra note 157, for a more complete discussion of this interpretive problem.
182. "Members," among other things, have the ability to "effect transactions... without the
services of another person acting as broker," or as a "registered broker or dealer which agrees to be
regulated by such exchange." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(i-ii) (1995).
183. The PTSs have often argued that they are not exchanges because they have no physical trading
floor. Instinet No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,931; POSIT No-Action Letter, supra note 101,
at 77,658. The PTSs' reliance on the lack of a physical "floor," however, seems misplaced. In one of
its interpretations of the term "exchange," the SEC explicitly acknowledged that the necessary
centralized trading place "may be varied, ranging from a physical floor or trading system (where orders
can be centralized and executed) to other means of intermediation (such as a formal market making
system or systemic procedures such as a consolidated limit order book or regular single price auction)."
Delta Release, supra note 101, at 1895. In 1991, the SEC granted an exemption to a single price
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directly and negotiate their trades on behalf of themselves and their retail
clients. PTS customers, like exchange members, typically sign extensive
agreements with PTSs which articulate the rules that govern participation in the
system" and give PTSs the power to terminate the agreement for any
substantial violations of its terms." Finally, rather than offering an open
facility, these systems restrict their membership usually to institutional
investors and market professionals and impose capital requirements for
participation.
18 6
Even if a PTS is deemed an "exchange" under the Act, it can escape
regulation by seeking exemption under section 5 of the Act.'87 Section 5
makes it illegal for any brokers, dealers, or exchanges to effect transactions on
an exchange unless it is registered under section 6 of the Act, or is, "exempted
from such registration . . . because, in the opinion of the Commission, by
reason of the limited volume of transactions effected on such exchange, it is
not practicable and not necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors to require such registration."188 The NYSE, in its
continuing battle against the non-regulation of PTSs, has challenged the scope
of this exemption, arguing that Congress meant it to apply only to exchanges
that were operating in 1934 but could not appropriately be regulated by the
SEC because of their location or operations.'89 The SEC rejected this
position, outlining a three prong standard for application for the "limited
volume" exemption. The exchange must demonstrate (1) that it will have a
auction, the Arizona Stock Exchange. While this system was exempt from registration as a "national
securities exchange" under the "limited volume" exception, the SEC did find that, as a threshold matter,
the System was an "exchange" as defined in section 3(a)(1). Wunsch Release, supra note 101, at 8380
n.36. When originally considering these systems, the SEC did note that they had "no trading floor and
do not necessarily have a number of other characteristics, such as ownership and control by members,
that have historically been associated with securities exchanges." Proposed Rule 15c2-10, supra note
153, at 83,682. While the PTSs have repeatedly quoted this language in their no-action requests, it is
important to note that this is an expression of the SEC's view in the earliest days of its consideration
of these systems, an interpretation which seems to have shifted with the acceptance of AZX as an
"exchange." Even in 1969, the SEC warned that "some of these systems could be viewed in certain
circumstances as falling within the definition in the Securities Exchange Act of either an exchange..
or a broker-dealer." Id.
184. Instinet's customers sign "Subscriber's Agreements" which Instinet differentiates from
traditional brokerage agreements by characterizing them as "service" agreements, a characterization
which seems closer to the definition of "exchange." Instinet No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at
78,922.
185. While Instinct acknowledges this "enforcement" type ability, in its 1986 letter it stated that
it had exercised this authority "only once in the last three years." Id. at 78,931. Instinet's failure to
exercise its disciplinary authority, whether because its members have behaved, or because it has not
been diligent in pursuing possible violations, does not mean that such authority does not exist for
definitional purposes.
186. Instinct No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,932 n.64. Instinet has noted that inclusion
of retail investors is economically impracticable and would probably face regulatory barriers even if it
were not. Id. at 78,925.
187. The Wunsch system, now known as the AZX, is the only PTS currently operating under a
"limited volume" exemption. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. IV, at AIV-10.
188. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1995).
189. Wunsch Release, supra note 101, at 8378.
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limited volume of transactions; (2) that it is "not practicable" for the exchange
to register; 9 and (3) that it is not "necessary for the public interest" that the
exchange register because it promises to file adequate reports with the SEC and
to conduct internal surveillance procedures that are sufficient to protect
investors. 9' One of the most controversial aspects of this definition of
"exchange" involves how small the volume would have to be to qualify for the
exemption. The SEC has indicated, however, that if AZX, or any other non-
registered exchange, reaches the volume of the smallest registered exchange,
it should approach the SEC for review of its exemption."
2. Regulation as "broker-dealers"
The PTSs have also argued that their activities are more closely akin to
those of a traditional "brokerage" firm than to an "exchange." They often
argue that their computer systems are simply the modem "electronic analog"
to the telephone networks that have connected traditional brokers and dealers
in the past."
Broker-dealers"9 play an important role in the securities markets. They
facilitate trading by collecting customer orders and executing them in one of
the various possible markets. Broker-dealers are members of the NYSE and
190. The NYSE argued that it should be the "practicability" for the SEC, rather than for the
exchange, that should be the standard. Id. at 8378 n.20.
191. Id. at 8381.
192. Id. at 8380 n.40. According to the NYSE, the 1993 Total Share Volume in NYSE-listed stocks
(which compromise most of CSE trading) for the CSE was 1,045,758,000. See 1993 NYSE FACT
BOOK, supra note 27. The triggering volume for AZX would presumably be around 1 billion shares.
Actual trading volume for the PTSs is extremely difficult to determine, given that PTSs are not currently
required to report their volume for the systems separately from their broker volume reported to the
NASD. Interview with James E. Shapiro, Managing Director, Economic Research, New York Stock
Exchange, New York, New York (Mar. 31, 1995). Although it is unlikely that any have yet reached
the CSE's volume, some may be close. The NYSE's most current estimates indicate that AZX's average
daily volume in NYSE-listed shares in 1993 was 385,000 shares, which translates into about 97 million
shares for the year, in NYSE-listed shares alone. (Unpublished NYSE document on file with author.)
AZX reported its January, 1994 daily volume at over 1.1 million shares. ITGI Press Release, supra note
128. This number, however, probably includes both sides of the trade and thus translates to about
600,000 shares. If this rate continued for the entire year, it would translate into over 1 billion shares.
POSIT estimated its 1993 volume at 2 billion shares, which probably translates to about 1 billion shares.
Id. These numbers indicate that both POSIT and AZX may be close to reaching the "limited volume"
number.
193. Instinet No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,918.
194. Although most firms act as both "brokers" and "dealers, these two entities have different
functions as defined under the Act. Under the 1934 Act, a "broker" is defined as "any person engaged
in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a
bank." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 3(a)(4) (1995). Generally, brokers act as agents
in transactions, accepting orders from customers and attempting to execute those orders on the best
possible terms. For providing these execution services, they earn commission fees. The Act defines a
"dealer", on the other hand, as "any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for
his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a bank, or any person insofar as
he buys or sells securities for his own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not
as a part of a regular business." Id. at § 3(a)(5). In general, dealers act as principals in transactions,
trading for their own accounts and earning profits on the spread. The spread allows them to buy low
for their own accounts and then sell high, profiting from the price differential.
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other exchanges and thus, provide access to those trading floors where trades
are executed. In the NASDAQ market, the dealers create the market when they
act as "market makers" who are willing to accept and fill orders based on the
firm quotes they have entered into the system. Traditionally, brokers and
dealers have conducted business either through their personnel located on a
trading floor or, in the NASDAQ market, through the telephone communica-
tions between interested traders and market makers. In more recent years, the
exchanges have computerized some of the broker-dealer functions by
developing associated execution systems that allow broker-dealers to send
orders to the exchange floor electronically, like NYSE's SuperDOT system.
Individuals or firms that fall under the definition of "broker" or "dealer"
are required to register with the SEC and become a member of an SRO. All
brokers and dealers are members of the NASD, which is primarily responsible
for policing their activities. Registration as a "broker" or "dealer" triggers a
panoply of rules, such as the customer protection rule",e and the net capital
rule,"% designed to prevent fraud by broker-dealers. Broker-dealers are
required to report their transactions to the NASD for reporting to the
Consolidated Tape."9
The PTSs repeatedly highlight the ways in which they act as brokers rather
than as exchanges. Instinet, for example, emphasizes that its primary role is to
accept orders from customers, which it then carries to a market maker or
specialist for execution, or communicates either to other institutional customers
or to other broker-dealers. 9 ' Instinet claims that it does not act as a dealer
and does not transact for itself through the system,' but rather limits its
activities to classic brokerage functions which include carrying orders to
specialists or market makers on behalf of clients who wish to maintain
anonymity or executing orders that are matched in the system strictly on an
agency basis." Instinet argues that because it acts as a broker, it should be
regulated under "functional regulation" principles.
Despite these arguments, PTSs do deviate from traditional brokerage
functions in several crucial ways. Instinet, for example, is not a "passive"
pricing system; it engages in price discovery by allowing customer orders to
interact directly and reach prices between the spread, a practice that is often
195. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (1995).
196. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1995).
197. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, app. m, at 11I-3.
198. Instinct No-Action Letter, supra note 101, at 78,929.
199. Id. at 78,924.
200. In fact, Instinet often argues that its actions do not even rise to the level of typical "brokerage"
activity in many respects. For instance, Instinet's order routing service, where entered orders are simply
routed directly to floor specialists or market makers who have entered into an agreement with Instinct
to guarantee execution of any trades routed to them in this manner, does not even involve the
participation of INC, Instinet's associated broker, to carry the orders to the floor. Id. at 78,929. In
addition, Instinet has little or no discretion over its customers accounts; the system allows the customer
to give extremely specific instructions as to how its orders should be handled. Id.
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associated with an exchange rather than a broker.2" The SEC has also noted
significant differences between the PTSs and the telephone communication
networks relied on in the past:
Automated trading information systems, however, differ from these traditional
communications devices in a number of significant respects, among others: (1) they
can be used solely in securities transactions and not for general purposes, (2) there
are varying limitations as to the users of the system facilities, (3) their internal
programming imposes a high degree of restriction on the content of the messages
that may be sent over them, (4) the identity of persons sending messages over the
systems is always known to those systems but, depending on the system, may never
be known to the recipients of the messages, and (5) the systems themselves can be
programmed to determine when a transaction has been executed.
2
Therefore, PTSs argue that they are not exchanges for purposes of regulation,
but that they do perform some of the functions of exchanges, such as price
discovery.
B. Regulation Through a New Structure: Rule 15c2-10
As mentioned above, the SEC has proposed new Rule 15c2-10 twice, both
times withdrawing it prior to adoption. The SEC re-proposed Rule 15c2-10 in
1989 with substantial modifications from its original form and a much more
detailed discussion of the underlying policy issues concerning regulation of
these systems. This discussion, as well as the substance of the proposal, was
informed in large part by the SEC's experience with the regulation of the
systems through its no-action policy. The SEC noted that it had received
substantial criticism for its no-action approach, which neither gave the public
a chance to comment nor provided potential sponsors with a reliable regulatory
regime. 3 While acknowledging that the systems were currently subject to
some regulation by the NASD by virtue of the participation of registered
broker dealers, the SEC also explicitly acknowledged the limitations of such
regulation in light of the increased volume of PTSs.2
The SEC then directly addressed several of the regulatory issues surround-
ing the development of PTSs. First, the SEC expressed its view that these
systems were not "exchanges " " and that regulating them under section 6
201. 1993 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 539 (Instinet Corporation's Responses to Post-Hearing
Questions). Instinet made this argument in response to concerns regarding PTSs "free-riding" off the
price discovery services of the traditional exchanges; ironically, it is also the argument which
characterizes them as such exchanges.
202. Proposed Rule 15c2-10, supra note 153, at 83,682.
203. Proprietary Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 26,708, supra note 153, at 80,055
(referencing letters from the NYSE, Amex, CBOE, and the SIA.) The SEC itself also indicated that the
no-action approach posed difficulties for coordination with international authorities for intermarket
linkage, regulation, and surveillance.
204. Id. at 80,059 nn.37-38.
205. The SEC emphasized the fact that the systems "have not ... evolved into interdealer
quotation or transaction mechanisms in which participants enter two-sided quotations on a regular or
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would be inappropriate on several policy grounds: (1) it would act as a
substantial "barrier to entry" and would discourage development of the systems
by imposing costly regulatory burdens;' and (2) it would jeopardize the
ability of institutional investors to participate directly in the systems because
of the section 6 restrictions on the types of entities that qualify for "member-
ship."207 In addition, the SEC noted that since participation in these systems
was generally limited to institutional investors, the need for extensive
regulatory oversight was not as urgent as it was for those systems that included
retail investors.2 8
Second, the SEC briefly discussed the concerns raised by the other markets
that PTSs were not bearing their fair share of the regulatory burden and thus
were competing unfairly against the established markets for order flow. The
SEC failed, however, to discuss the validity or implications of these concerns,
simply concluding that "it is important for sponsors of these systems to accept
clear responsibility for enforcing compliance by their participants with the
securities laws. "29
Like the original Rule 15c2-10, this revised version would also have
required system sponsors to file a proposed plan, which would have become
operational only after the SEC declared the plan "effective."210 The rule
would apply to all "trading systems," as defined by the rule, with the following
exceptions: (1) systems that were limited to use by their own retail customers,
thus serving merely to "automate the internal execution functions traditionally
engaged in by an integrated broker-dealer"; (2) systems acting as "brokers'
brokers" for non-equity securities; and (3) systems operated by a national
securities exchange or association, such as NYSE's DOT or the NASD's
SOES.21' The filed plan would have included a list of specified information,
including: (1) a detailed description of the system, its method of operation, and
the types of securities that would be traded in it; (2) a description of
procedures supervising compliance with the securities laws, and an agreement
to report violations or suspected violations to the SEC; (3) a description of
recordkeeping procedures and an agreement to adequately report relevant
information to the SEC; (4) a description of participant eligibility, including
financial soundness requirements; and (5) a description of procedures for
dealing with system failures and an agreement to report such failures to the
continuous basis, thus ensuring a liquid marketplace." Id. at 80,059.
206. Id. The SEC has acknowledged that regulatory costs do not increase in a linear fashion and
thus impose a larger burden on smaller volume systems. See Wunsch Release, supra note 101, at 8382.
207. Proprietary Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 26,708, supra note 153, at 80,059
n.31.
208. Id. at 80,059 n.32.
209. Id. at 80,060.
210. The SEC would have followed the approval procedures of Rule 1 lAa3-3-2, requiring approval
of the plan within at least 180 days of submission. Id. at 80,062.
211. Id. at 80,061.
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SEC.212 The SEC articulated a three-prong standard it would apply in
determining whether or not to approve a plan:
(i) whether the sponsor and system had the ability to comply with the terms of the
plan;
(ii) whether the plan is "necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the
protection of investors and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets and to
remove impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a national market
system..."; and
(iii) whether the plan "does not impose a burden on competition."21a
The rule also formalized the procedure for amending the existing plan. The
amendment procedure would be essentially the same as the Rule 19b-4
procedure, except that all changes would take effect within thirty days unless
the SEC specifically announced that it would publish the rule and seek
comment from the public. In addition, system sponsors would also be allowed
to take advantage of section 19(b)(3)(A), which would enable certain SRO rules
to take effect immediately.
214
The arguments of the PTSs are not such unreasonable interpretations of the
statutory language to merit such minimal discussion by the SEC. In reality, the
SEC may have been more persuaded by the policy concerns raised by the PTSs
than by their interpretations of the statutes. These policy arguments represent
much of the debate concerning the underlying market structure and the SEC's
vision of its strengths and weaknesses.
In the 1975 Amendments, Congress articulated several broad policy goals
which it expected the NMS to achieve, including efficient executions, fair
competition in the markets, increased dissemination of information, increased
"best execution," and an increased ability for investors to execute orders
without dealer participation."' The NMS legislation seemingly adopted a
decentralized version of the market by emphasizing certain characteristics of
intermarket competition for order flow. However, the call for market linkage
also seemed fueled by the desire for centralization. Thus, the 1975 Amend-
ments fostered uncertainty with regard to the structure of the securities
markets. This dual and somewhat conflicting view articulated in the NMS
legislation has given both sides of the PTS debate an opportunity to use the
legislation to their own advantage and has left the SEC with no clear mandate
as to how to approach the market structure issue.
The PTSs have repeatedly emphasized the benefits of their system with
regard to the furtherance of NMS goals.21 6 They correctly point out that
212. Id. at 80,062.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 80,063.
215. See, e.g., LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 55, at 2485 n.36.
216. See, e.g., 1993 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 454 (prepared statement of Michael
Sanderson, President and Chief Executive Officer, Instinct Corporation); id. at 484 (prepared statement
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PTSs accomplish several of Congress's stated goals, namely the increased use
of advancing technology to modernize the U.S. securities market, an increased
opportunity for investors to avoid dealer participation, and the enhancement of
"best execution" 2 7 achieved by keeping broker-dealers better informed of
their trading options. PTSs heighten the competition between markets, thereby
pressuring those markets to provide better services in the growing high-tech
securities trading profession.
The exchanges and the NASD, on the other hand, have been critical of the
role PTSs play in the current regulatory environment. 2 ' The objections of
the NYSE and the NASD are probably at least partially motivated by
competitive concerns; they fear the diversion of significant portions of order
flow away from their systems and the consequent reduction of the value of
participation in their systems. The NYSE argues that without further
regulation, the PTSs will only further exacerbate the already somewhat
fragmented market, in opposition to the NMS goals.2 19
The SEC has, despite the exchanges' arguments, recognized the potential
for PTSs to help achieve NMS goals. 2 The SEC is concerned about
fashioning a regulatory regime that will continue to encourage the innovation
that PTSs have already brought to the markets, both directly and through their
impact on the development of similar technologies by the established
exchanges, while also adequately overseeing these systems with respect to
investor protection and market structure implications.221 The SEC's inability
to navigate aggressively the competing NMS goals and the various arguments
of PTS critics and proponents has led to the inconsistent regulatory efforts to
date.
C. Recent Regulatory Action: Market 2000, New Rule 17a-23, and
Proposed Amendments to Rule 11Ac1-i
In 1992, the SEC announced that it was "undertaking a study of the
structure of the U.S. equity markets and of the regulatory environment in
of Raymond L. Killian, Jr., President, ITG, Inc.).
217. What constitutes "best execution" is by no means clear; however, it usually includes some
component of achieving the lowest price (for a purchase) or the highest price (for a sale) among the
various markets. Order Execution Obligations, supra note 8, at 52,793.
218. The NYSE and the NASD have made different arguments against the current regulation of
PTSs. The NASD has generally supported the existence of PTSs in their current form, but has called
for increased regulation of them in order to level the regulatory playing field. The NASD believes that
the PTSs have not "had an adverse impact on market quality." Letter from Joseph R. Hardiman,
President, NASD to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, supra note 150, at 14. The NYSE, on the other
hand, has been more critical of the potential for PTSs to adversely fragment the market. See 1993 House
Hearings, supra note 9, at 447-78 (prepared statement of Edward A. Kwalwasser, Executive Vice
President, NYSE).
219. Id.
220. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study HI, at II-1 (discussing the benefits of diverse markets);
Rule 17a-23 Proposal Release, supra note 99.
221. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study III, at II-1 to 11-2.
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which those markets operate."2 Ambitiously entitled "Market 2000," the
goal of the study was to analyze the effects of several significant market
changes. Among those identified were the increasing concentration of holdings
in U.S. equities, the increasing use of new financial products and new trading
strategies, and the development of new trading technologies, including the
growth of "alternate" markets such as proprietary trading systems. The study,
released in January 1994, included numerous recommendations, some of which
were aimed at PTSs and some of which were directed at the structure of the
market in general. In the opening paragraphs of the SEC statement accompany-
ing the release of the Market 2000 report, the SEC noted that "the title 'Market
2000' has proven too facile."' Several commentators have criticized the
study, both in terms of its approach and its failure to confront the more
difficult regulatory issues comprehensively. 24 The report's treatment of the
PTS issue is no exception.
1. New Rule 17a-23
The Market 2000 study found that Rule 15c2-10 was not the most effective
way to regulate "broker dealer trading systems" (BDTSs) and suggested that
a new rule should be proposed to increase the SEC's information about these
systems. 2' In December 1994, in response to some of the recommendations
of the Market 2000 report, the SEC finalized new Rule 17a-23, which
increases the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of these systems. Rule
17a-23 seeks to regulate BDTSs2  as broker-dealers rather than as limited
222. U.S. Equity Market Structure Study, supra note 65, at 32,587.
223. Statement by the SEC Upon Release of the Market 2000 Report (Jan. 27, 1994), in MARKET
2000, supra note 5, at v.
224. Joel Seligman, Another Unspecial Study: The SEC's Market 2000 Report and Competitive
Developments in the United States Capital Markets, SYMPOSIUM, SHAPING REGULATORY POLICY FOR
THE CAPITAL MARKETS, SEC. BUS. LAW ABA, (Sept. 16-17, 1994); see also Christi Harlan, Market
2000 Sets Its Sights on the Present, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 1993, at 15.
225. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study III, at 111-12. In a telephone interview, SEC staff attorney
Kristen N. Geyer noted that several new systems had become operational around the time of the 1989
proposal, and more have begun operations since that time, giving the SEC more information from which
to propose the new rule. Telephone Interview with Kristen N. Geyer, Staff Attorney, SEC (Mar. 15,
1994).
226. The SEC has renamed these systems as "Broker Dealer Trading Systems." This new term
encompasses not only the systems previously called "Proprietary Trading Systems," but also expands
the definition to include some automated trading systems operated by third market makers. Rule 17a-23
Proposal Release, supra note 99, at 8368; Rule 17a-23 Adoption Release, supra note 155, at 86,119
(determining that the scope of covered systems is equivalent to that in the proposed rule). Specifically,
the new rule defines "broker-dealer trading systems" to mean:
any facility that provides a mechanism, automated in full or in part, for: (i) collecting,
receiving, disseminating, or displaying system orders; and (ii) matching, crossing, or
executing system orders, or otherwise facilitating agreement to the basic terms of a purchase
or sale of a security between system participants, or between a system participant and the
system sponsor, through use of the system or through the system sponsor.
17 C.F.R. § 240-17a-23(b)(2) (1995).
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volume exchanges or under a new regime as was envisioned by Rule 15c2-
10. 7 The rule lists certain records that sponsors28 of BDTSs are required
to keep, including system participants; daily trading summaries identifying
securities traded, transaction volume and orders entered into the system;
records of each transaction, including the time, price, and method of execution;
and any notices generally sent by the sponsor to participants.229 The 13DTS
sponsor's reporting requirements are related to new Form 17a-23, which
consists of three parts. Part I must be filed at least 20 days prior to the
beginning of the operation of the BDTS, and requires a complete description
of the system." Part II requires the BDTS sponsor to file quarterly reports
that summarize system trading for each quarter. Part III must be filed within
10 days after the operation of the system is terminated.23" '
The SEC articulated two major goals underlying the regulatory approach
of Rule 17a-23: (1) collecting information about BDTSs which would allow the
SEC to develop a better regulatory approach in the future; and (2) providing
prospective sponsors with more certainty as to their regulatory responsibili-
ties.232 The SEC noted that although the sponsors of the systems were all
registered broker-dealers and thus subject to their own recordkeeping and
reporting requirements under section 17, they had not been required to identify
separately transactions they had made through the system. 233 The SEC noted
that
[t]his lack of system-specific information makes it difficult for the SEC to evaluate
the operation of BDTSs with regard to national market system goals, to monitor the
227. The SEC adopted the arguments of the PTSs, concluding that, "the functions performed by
BDTSs are most closely aligned with the functions performed by broker-dealers; consequently, broker-
dealer regulation of BDTS sponsors is appropriate." Rule 17a-23 Proposal Release, supra note 99, at
8369 n.10.
228. The rule specifically defines the "sponsor" of a BDTS to be:
any entity that organizes, operates, administers, or otherwise directly controls a broker-dealer
trading system; and, if the system operator of such broker-dealer trading system is not a
registered broker or dealer, any registered broker or dealer that, pursuant to contract,
affiliation, or other agreement with the system operator, is involved materially on a regular
basis with executing transactions in connection with the use of the broker-dealer trading
system, other than solely for its own account or as a participant in the broker-dealer trading
system.
17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-23(b)(3) (1995). In other words, each of these systems is expected to include the
participation of at least one registered broker-dealer, which will be the hook for bringing it under the
BDTS umbrella. Functionally, this approach will work because, as the SEC has repeatedly emphasized,
the activities undertaken by these systems at some point require someone to execute and clear the trade,
functions which could not be done legally without registration as a broker-dealer. See, e.g., Rule 17a-23
Proposal Release, supra note 99, at 8368 n.4.
229. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-23(c) (1995). The sponsor is required to keep these records for three
years.
230. Rule 17a-23 Adoption Release, supra note 155, at 86,123. In addition, once the system is
operating, the BDTS sponsor must make an additional filing 20 days before implementing a "material
change" in the program. Id.
231. Rule 17a-23 Adoption Release, supra note 155, at 86,123-31.
232. Rule 17a-23 Proposal Release, supra note 99, at 8368.
233. Id. at 8368-69.
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competitive effects of these systems, to ascertain whether broker-dealer regulation
remains appropriate for the operation of such systems, and to identify areas where
monitoring of such systems may be improved and where SRO surveillance may be
more appropriately tailored to the detection of fraudulent, deceptive and manipula-
tive practices in an automated environment."
The SEC's experience with several PTSs that have begun operations since 1987
may have increased the SEC's knowledge of these systems. More importantly,
as of March 1995, the SEC had not received any formal complaints regarding
abuses or other problems in these systems, and the current participation of
registered broker-dealers who are subject to regulatory oversight and rules
(such as capital requirements, best execution, and "know your customer" rules)
may provide sufficient protection for the investors who use them.235 The SEC
did acknowledge, however, that it intends to use any additional knowledge it
gains to examine the SRO oversight of these systems with respect to the
potential for fraudulent or manipulative practices."s
In deciding to regulate these systems as broker-dealers, the SEC was
careful to note that registration as a BDTS did not permanently resolve the
issue of their possible future classification as "exchanges" or other entities. In
a footnote to the proposing release, the SEC noted that, "[t]he Rule does not
address the issue of whether a particular trading system may be required to
register as a national securities exchange, clearing agency, or other SRO.
Sponsors of BDTSs seeking relief from exchange, clearing agency, and other
SRO registration requirements may continue to request no-action positions from
the Division."237 Thus, the SEC seems to have left itself the option of
revisiting the issue of whether or not these systems could fall under this
category in the future and the option of seeking exchange or SRO registration
from a system that had made the appropriate Rule 17a-23 filings.
2. Proposed Rule llAcl-1 Amendments
In October 1995, the SEC proposed new regulations, aimed at improving
executions for all investors in the U.S. equity markets. These proposals would
234. Id. at 8368. This lack of separate information means that it would be difficult to determine,
for instance, whether a system has risen above the "limited volume" level and makes it difficult for the
SEC to monitor the accuracy of advertising materials that the PTSs distribute, which often refer to the
trading volume in the systems.
235. See Telephone Interview with Kristen M. Geyer, supra note 235. Geyer also noted, however,
that one of the purposes of new Rule 17a-23 was to give the SEC more information to help determine
whether or not the broker-dealer provisions are, in fact, providing sufficient protection for investors
using the systems. See also Rule 17a-23 Proposal Release, supra note 99, at 8371 (discussing the
potential fraud problems such systems may present that are, "typically associated with markets, not with
traditional broker-dealers," and the SEC's need for additional information to assess this potential).
236. Rule 17a-23 Proposal Release, supra note 104, at 8371 (noting that the PTSs may have the
potential to experience fraud problems "typically associated with markets, not with traditional broker-
dealers").
237. Id. at 8373 n.40.
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amend Rule 1 Acl-I (the Quote Rule) and Rules 1 Acl-4 and 1 Acl-5, which
regard best execution and limit order display obligations, to "improve the
opportunity of investors to obtain the best execution possible for their
orders. "238
The SEC has proposed to amend the Quote Rule to require that market
makers or specialists who display quotes in PTSs include the price and volume
of those quotes in their publicly displayed quotes.239 The SEC proposal
changes the definition of "bid" or "offer" under the Quote Rule to include any
bid or offer that is displayed in a PTS, thus triggering the commensurate duty
to distribute that quotation publicly, as required by the current terms of Rule
llAcl-1.2 ° This new requirement would apply to the market maker or
specialist even if the customer has specifically requested that her trading
interest not be displayed.24'
In proposing this amendment, the SEC seems to have shifted its views of
some of the market structure issues previously discussed in the PTS context.
The SEC summed up its motivations for the new proposal by noting that:
due to an increasing number of electronic communications networks being
developed by market participants and market centers, quotation information is
becoming splintered, with OTC market makers and specialists publishing different
proposed trading prices in different quotation systems, some with limited access.
As a result smaller retail customers do not always obtain the benefit of the best
available price. While these systems may have increased intermarket competition,
the SEC believes that consolidated quotations and their dissemination to the public
continue to be important elements of the NMS. Moreover, while competition is an
important goal of the NMS, competition based on fragmented quotations may
reduce efficient pricing of publicly disseminated bids and offers, thereby impeding
the NMS goal of consolidated quotations. More importantly, the availability of
accurate quotation information enables investors to police the efforts of their
brokerage firms.242
This articulation of the balance between encouraging competition and
238. Order Execution Obligations, supra note 8, at 52,792. Although this Article will focus on the
aspect of these rule proposals aimed at PTSs, the rules will also: (1) expand the public quoting
obligations for broker-dealers who account for more than 1% of the volume in a listed security to non-
Rule 19c-3 securities, for which such quoting is currently only voluntary; (2) establish requirements for
the uniform public display of limit orders; (3) clarify broker-dealers' duties to seek price improvement
for their customers' orders under the best execution obligations, particularly in light of changing
technology that may alter the broker-dealers' feasible monitoring of multiple markets. Id. at 52,794.
239. The broker-dealers will be required to include the volume up to a level determined by the
relevant SRO. Id. at 52,798.
240. Id. at 52,797-98. The new quoting requirements will only extend to firm quotes entered by
the broker-dealers, and will not extend to the "indications of interest" which are also entered into some
of the PTSs, nor will it apply to odd-lot orders. Id. at 52,798.
241. Id. Note that this is in contrast to the proposed amendments regarding the duties of exchange
specialists to publicly display limit orders; the specialists will still be allowed to conceal interests at the
specific request of a customer. Id. at 52,802. The SEC has specifically requested comment as to whether
such a customer request should be honored if the broker is acting on a purely agency basis when placing
the order into the PTSs. Id. at 52,798.
242. Id. at 52,796-97.
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maintaining the integrity of the markets contrasts with the SEC's similar
discussion of the issues in the Market 2000 report that generated the Rule 17a-
23 concept.2 43
This proposal would not have any direct effect on the institutional trading
interest that is now displayed in PTSs. Rule 11Acl-i applies only to market
makers and specialists involved with exchanges or associations. As such, the
rule cannot directly regulate the activities of the institutional investors that
enter trading interest directly into these systems without the assistance of a
regulated intermediary. Thus, under the new proposal, institutional investors
would still be free to display their interest in these systems without distributing
them more widely to the investing public.
D. A Critique of Recent Regulatory Action
After over twenty years of attempting to promulgate a rule regarding PTSs,
the SEC has finalized Rule 17a-23, which seems only to perpetuate its
incomplete approach to the issue. The SEC has justified its approach by
claiming that it needs more information before it can determine what would be
the appropriate regulatory regime. 2' In reality, however, the SEC may have
pulled back from a more aggressive regulatory program in the face of pressure
both from the system sponsors and from the general deregulatory environment.
Rather than address the issue in a comprehensive way, the SEC has called for
a relatively uncontroversial information collection approach, while continuing
to ignore unresolved issues about the potential for regulation of these systems
as exchanges or other SROs. Thus, while the SEC has indicated its attempts to
clarify the definition so that PTS developers could enter the competitive market
with a clearer understanding of the rules, 5 Rule 17a-23 has left the industry
with continuing uncertainty as to the future of PTS regulation.2'
The new rule has several specific problems. First, because the SEC wanted
to reach the systems, and not the broker-dealers operating the systems (over
whom the SEC already has adequate regulatory oversight), it constructed the
definition of "sponsor" in a way that avoided giving the system operators a
243. In the Market 2000 report, the SEC concluded that, "the U.S. equity markets today include
multiple, varied market centers. The competition around these market centers provides many benefits
for the users of the markets. Moreover, the dispersion of order flow among market centers has not
impaired price discovery or market quality. While primary market competitors use the externalities
provided by the primary markets, the latter are adequately compensated for their primary market status."
MARKEr 2000, supra note 5, Study III, at n-3.
244. Rule 17a-23 Proposal Release, supra note 99, at 8368.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., ITGI FoRM 10-K, supra note 120, at 6 (noting that "although the adoption of Rule
17a-23 in the form proposed by the Commission would not have any significant effect on the operation
of the Company's business, one of the stated purposes of the Rule is to provide the Commission with
information necessary to monitor and evaluate automated trade execution systems. As a result, there can
be no assurance that the Commission will not in the future seek to impose more stringent regulatory
requirements on the operation of automated trade execution systems such as POSIT.").
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loophole around the reporting requirements by simply contracting out their
brokerage activities. Thus, the "sponsor" definition reaches not only broker-
dealers who own and operate such systems, but also any broker-dealer who "is
involved materially on a regular basis with executing transactions in connection
with the use of the broker-dealer trading system."247 In the event that a non-
registered BDTS owner develops a system, similar to Lattice, where users can
choose to route their orders to any one of ten different broker-dealers who are
under contract with the system to accept and execute such orders, the SEC,
while getting reporting from the individual broker dealers, will still not be able
to collect the BDTS system information it desires, resulting in the same lack
of information it currently faces.248
Secondly, the SEC has not addressed the real regulatory problems that arise
when categorizing these entities as broker-dealers without recognizing that
these systems are not traditional brokerage firms. For instance, under Rule
17a-23, the SEC still lacks the ability to approve the fairness of the systems'
trading rules, 249 to monitor other operational and procedural aspects of the
system,2 o or to monitor the validity of the advertising claims of the systems,
such as the extent to which the systems comply with primary market protection
claims. 251
Finally, treating PTSs as broker-dealers fails to address structural issues
with regard to the existing exchanges such as fragmentation and unfair
competitive advantages. For example, the Market 2000 report mentions
proposals by commentators to split the market by user into separate markets for
institutional and retail investors. 52 The SEC rejects this approach because it
would jeopardize the efficiency and integrity of the markets. 3 PTSs,
however, may be effectively creating this split between institutional and retail
investors by routing institutional trading away from the traditional exchanges.
247. 17 C.F.R. § 240-17a-23 (b)(3) (1995).
248. The SEC would probably be uncomfortable allowing such a system to operate, although it is
unclear under what authority it would prevent such a structure given that the 17a-23 approach has
explicitly rejected the 15c2-10 SEC pre-approval powers.
249. 1993 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 51 (prepared statement by Joseph R. Hardiman,
President, NASD); Id. at 153 (joint statement by the Boston, Midwest, Pacific, and Philadelphia Stock
Exchanges); Id. at 445 (prepared statement of Edward A. Kwalwasser, Executive Vice President,
NYSE).
250. Id. at 445-46 (prepared statement of Edward A. Kwalwasser, Executive Vice President,
NYSE).
251. Id. at 153 (joint report by the Boston, Midwest, Pacific and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges).
252. See, e.g., Letter from Charles R. Hood, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Instinet
Corporation to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 19 (Oct. 19, 1992) (available in SEC Public Reference
Room, File No. 57-18-92) (discussing the benefits of separation between institutional and individual
investors); Letter from Thomas M. O'Donnell, Chairman, Securities Industry Association to Jonathan
G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 5-7, 10 (July 1, 1993) (available in SEC Public Reference Room, File No. S7-
18-92) (discussing the different needs of institutional and individual investors and the benefits of
allowing them to trade in separate markets); Harris, supra note 81 (discussing generally the benefits and
potential harms of separating institutional and individual investors); CALPERS Letter, supra note 22
(discussing institutional needs for separation).
253. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study VI, at VI-3.
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Rule 17a-23 failed to address the PTSs' contribution to the separation of
markets. 4 The rule also failed to resolve issues regarding unfair intramarket
competition and the role of regulation in maintaining the integrity of the
markets.25'
To be fair, the enhanced reporting requirements of Rule 17a-23 will
increase the SEC's insight into the role of PTSs. 6 The statistics available
to the public regarding order flow in the systems is currently provided solely
by the PTSs themselves, usually in the form of advertising literature. 57 The
increased reporting will help only the SEC, as the statistics will not be publicly
available. A better rule would allow the public to view volume numbers to
determine the accuracy of the advertising claims, particularly given that the
SEC has decided to let market forces determine the continuing vitality of PTSs.
Ultimately, the failure to fashion a more comprehensive approach to PTS
regulation means that the SEC will adopt a piecemeal approach to regulating
these systems when specific problems arise.
The SEC's recent proposal to amend Rule 11 Ac 1-1 with regard to PTSs is
an example of the limitations of piecemeal regulation. In proposing the changes
to Rule 1 Ac -1, the SEC noted several specific problems that might develop
as a result of the new amendments. First, the SEC noted that the possibility for
broker-dealers to publish quotes in the PTSs at price differentials that are much
smaller than for the NASD or the NYSE might create technical difficulties. 8
This problem, while addressed only in passing in the proposing release, will
be a major hurdle to effective implementation of these rules. Either the NASD
will have to convert to a smaller tick size quickly or the market makers and
specialists using the PTSs will have to increase the spreads of the quotes they
enter in the PTSs, a result which would seem contrary to the SEC's general
efforts to reduce spreads.
Second, the SEC noted that as soon as a market maker enters a bid on to
254. In the SEC's most recent discussion of the issue, it has recognized the PTSs' contribution to
the potentially disruptive split into tiered markets. Order Execution Obligations, supra note 8, at 52,792.
255. The SEC, in the past, has recognized that regulation of PTSs as broker-dealers may be
inappropriate precisely because it does limit surveillance of these structural and system-based issues.
Proprietary Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 26,708, supra note 153, at 80,060 n.38.
256. While the SEC certainly will have some additional information as a result of this rule, it is
unclear how much, as the reporting requirements under the current no-action letters is, in the SEC's
words, "substantially similar" to the requirements of Rule 17a-23. Rule 17a-23 Proposal Release, supra
note 99, at 7.
257. The NYSE has tried to compile statistics regarding the real flow of trades through the PTSs,
although it is difficult because for many of the systems the publicly released statistics may be
significantly overstated, compared to the NYSE statistics, through double counting (i.e. counting both
sides of the trades as shares "executed" through the system). Interview with James Shapiro, supra note
192.
258. Order Execution Obligations, supra note 8, at 52,798. For instance, if the broker-dealer is
posting a quote in a PTS at a 1/16 of a point, it would be difficult to publish that quote in a system
accepting orders at 1/8 of a point. The SEC specifically asked for comment on this difficulty, noting
that it "does not intend to create incentives for OTC market makers or specialists to increase the size
of the fractions they would quote" in PTS, and went on to conclude that the better solution might be
to lower the minimum price variations in the established markets. Id.
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one of these systems, it would then be obligated to publish two-sided quotes in
the stock. 5 9 This may lead to another unintended consequence of the rule;
to the extent that some market makers may not have been participating in the
public market for a given security, but may have been willing to display
trading interest in a PTS, they may withdraw their interest from all publication
rather than trigger public market making obligations. Such a result would
ultimately decrease transparency on the whole.
These problems are joined by some others not mentioned by the SEC. The
release indicated that the new quote obligations will not apply to "indications
of interest" entered in the system, but rather will extend only to firm
quotes.2" Thus, market makers or specialists wishing to make use of the
anonymity and other benefits of the PTSs may simply convert formerly firm
quotes to "indications of interest," thus allowing them to achieve substantially
similar trading results without any increase in the transparency desired by the
SEC.
As with Rule 17a-23 and the SEC's historical approach to the PTS issue,
however, the real weakness with this proposal lies in its failure to spring from
a more comprehensive approach to the regulation of PTSs. The SEC proposed
these new amendments in an attempt to increase the transparency of the
markets. In theory, this could help to both narrow the public spread26" ' and
increase the ability of retail investors to monitor the best execution efforts of
their brokers, 2 who may be aware of better prices existing in these systems,
but who are not accessing them on behalf of their customers. 263 This
proposed rule could, in fact, increase investors' awareness of better prices, an
awareness that is currently afforded only to the institutional investors who
themselves have access to the PTSs. However, because the quote rule is aimed
at market makers and specialists who are users of the systems, rather than the
systems themselves, a substantial portion of the trading interest displayed in the
PTSs-that entered directly by institutional investors-will still be hidden from
public view. Thus, while this rule could achieve one of the benefits of
transparency-increased best execution through more effective monitoring-it
will forgo the full value of some of the other benefits of transparency, such as
accurate price discovery and liquidity. Moreover, the failure to approach the
PTSs in a comprehensive fashion may result in some of the negative unintended
259. Id. The SEC also noted that a rapid withdrawal of the quote from the PTS would not
completely save the market maker, since a withdrawal prohibits the individual from making a market
in that issue for a subsequent pre-determined time period. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 52,794-95 (noting that the new rules will "enhance competition in publicly disseminated
quotes").
262. Id. at 52,798.
263. The SEC indicated that what fulfills a broker-dealer's best execution obligations may have
changed in light of the recent changes in technology. The SEC further indicated that where it is
economically practicable for a broker-dealer to access off-exchange trading environments such as PTSs,




Finally, the value of the SEC's conclusions regarding PTSs in the "Market
2000" Report may be hindered by the study's limited consideration of the
development of new financial products and the internationalization of the
securities market. Several PTSs trade non-equity issues, such as limited
partnerships, corporate debt, and options. Providing alternative trading in niche
markets may be one of the primary areas where PTSs could strengthen the
market. Any new regulation aimed at derivative or other non-equity products,
particularly regulations aimed at restricting the sales of these instruments to
highly sophisticated and informed investors, would need to incorporate
potential trading in the less regulated PTS environments. Internationalization
presents additional problems in the PTS context. The NYSE has expressed
concern about the potential to trade foreign securities in these systems,
securities that would be ineligible for trading on the traditional markets.'
As discussed above, some of the existing PTSs, such as Instinet, already have
extensive international linkages and other PTSs are actively seeking global
hook-ups. The information about and access to foreign markets that the PTSs
can and will provide are additional competitive advantages. In addition, one of
the concerns about over-regulation of PTSs is that it may drive much of the
institutional trading that is currently attracted to these systems into international
trading, even further reducing the ability of U.S. regulators to exert control
over this trading. 2" Market 2000's failure to address directly the issue of
internationalization, and perhaps to explore empirical data on the actual amount
of diversion off-shore, weakens its analysis of the PTSs' regulatory challenges.
IV. AN ALTERNATE PROPOSAL
Although the SEC's current approach appears unsatisfying, its underlying
motivations are not. The innovation and competition PTSs provide are likely
to have positive long-term effects on the securities market and should therefore
be encouraged. 2' PTSs give investors a range of trading options, from which
264. 1993 House Hearings, supra note 9. at 450-451 (prepared statement by Edward A.
Kwalwasser, Executive Vice President, NYSE). The SEC has also noted that without adequate regulation
of these systems, complying with the terms of agreements with foreign securities regulators might be
difficult. Proprietary Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 26,708, supra note 153, at 80,055.
265. See, e.g., POSIT Comment Letter, supra note 136, at 26; Greg Anders & Craig Torres, The
New Market: Computers Bypass Wall Street Middlemen and Stir Controversy, WALL ST. J. Aug. 28,
1991, at Al. The development of after hours trading systems also helps stem the diversion of order flow
off-shore, which is sometimes done because the U.S. markets are closed. The PTSs have been a major
catalyst for the development of these systems, both by directly offering the services, like Instinet's
Market Match and Crossing Session services, and by competitively encouraging the development of such
facilities by the traditional exchanges, such as the NYSE's Crossing Sessions I and II. See Letter from
Joseph Hardiman, President, NASD to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, supra note 150, at 26.
266. The experience with Rule 19c-3, which allowed OTC market makers to compete with the
NYSE for order flow in some of its listed stocks, suggests that decentralized trading may help, rather
than hurt, the individual investor by encouraging lower spreads and reduced costs. Studies indicate that
the spreads in 19c-3 securities have lowered, rather than raised, as a result of the intramarket
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they can choose the best individual mix of costs and benefits. In addition, the
development of PTSs dovetails with the NMS goals outlined by Congress in
1975 by enhancing investor ability to execute trades without dealer participa-
tion and increasing intermarket competition. Nevertheless, the SEC's current
regulatory approach should be discarded for one that more adequately
acknowledges the role these systems play in the market. The SEC should
regulate PTSs through an expanded application of a modified version of the
"limited volume" exception for exchange registration.'
As discussed in detail above, the SEC has interpreted the definition of
"exchange" to exclude most PTSs. The SEC has argued that it is confined to
this interpretation by the language of the Act, but, as the Seventh Circuit
noted, the SEC would be equally within its discretion to interpret the definition
of "exchanges" more broadly.2' The SEC's current interpretation appears
driven as much by policy concerns as by the actual language of the Act. Its
possible policy concerns include: (1) fears about articulating an interpretation
that will be overly broad and might grow uncontrollably; (2) the desire to
promote the development of these systems; and (3) fear that increasing
regulation will force more trading underground, where the SEC will have even
less control. 9 As to the second of these concerns, the "limited volume"
exception seems equally well suited to foster system development. One of the
SEC's concerns is that the regulatory costs associated with exchange status are
particularly onerous for the smaller PTSs. The "limited volume" exception
resolves this concern, by exempting a new PTS until its volume is such that it
can reasonably bear regulatory costs.27 This "limited volume" proposal also
addresses the potential problems created by PTSs because only at these larger
volumes does fragmentation dramatically affect the market prices for securities,
and only at these greater volumes can the other exchanges argue that the
systems are providing them with any meaningful or harmful competition.
competition for order flow. Id. at 6.
267. At least one other commentator has suggested that the SEC expand its use and application of
the limited volume exemption from exchange registration to encourage development of automated trading
systems. Nowak, supra note 89, at 518-22. Nowak suggested that the SEC create a new rule which
codified the application of the limited volume exemption for a certain class of automated systems which
would provide markets that provided services substantially similar to the NYSE's. In contrast, this
Article proposes that the exemption be applied to a broader variety of systems, not just ones aimed at
taking over the NYSE's role. These systems not only automate services similar to those provided by the
traditional services, but can also provide needed alternatives in niche markets or for certain market
users. These alternative markets could also be beneficially regulated in the "limited volume" structure
which strikes a balance between the freedom to innovate and the need to regulate.
268. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270, 1273 (7th Cir. 1991).
Alternatively, Congress could seek to clarify the meaning of "exchange" to encompass these systems,
by articulating a more precise definition of the term.
269. See also Nowak, supra note 89, at 521-22 (discussing the SEC's political concerns regarding
the regulation of PTSs).
270. In this respect, it is more appropriate than the congressional discussion of granting the
exemption for a specified time period (i.e. a year) during which there is no guarantee that the exchange
will reach an operating volume that either justifies, or can bear, additional regulatory costs. See 1993
House Hearings, supra note 9, at 528.
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The "limited volume" approach, which basically allows for different levels
of regulation depending on the size of the system, can only be applied to PTSs
with some important modifications. Like the "exchanges" currently operating
under section 6, PTSs will be expected to become SROs and thus bear the costs
of running their own surveillance and enforcement mechanisms. However, in
order for "limited volume" regulation to work, the SEC will have to modify
the "exchange" regulation that would be expected of PTSs after they reached
the threshold volume. To implement the "limited volume" approach would
require a number of steps.
First, the SEC would have to define clearly "limited volume" and specify
methods for measurement. A clear line would give PTSs an indication of when
higher regulations are triggered and would also provide the possibility for
existing exchanges to fall below that line. The SEC could use either a total
volume number or another measure, such as the percentage of total market
volume in a specific security. The best solution is a combination of both,
applied depending on what types of services PTSs offer. For systems that offer
trading in a wide variety of equity issues (more like a traditional exchange), a
total volume number should be used. A percentage volume number might be
more appropriate for the "niche" PTSs that offer trading in a limited number
of products, but which may dramatically affect the prices of the stocks they do
trade because of the absence of alternate trading arenas. The SEC would have
to define carefully the scope of each system and its appropriate measures to
prevent PTS evasion of regulation either by limiting itself to a single issue to
maintain small volume while significantly affecting price, or by subdividing
into smaller related units when trading volumes near the triggering level. To
avoid the latter problem, the SEC would have to define the PTS operator to
include all affiliated entities, and ensure that volume of all related entities is
combined for purposes of determining the volume exemption. Finally, to
respond to the claims of PTSs and smaller regional exchanges that the costs of
SRO activities at the current volume are economically prohibitive, the SEC
should consider raising the volume level that would trigger exchange
registration.
Second, the SEC needs to adopt a new rule to govern PTSs operating under
the "limited volume" exception, rather than allowing them to operate under
either the terms of a no-action letter or under the conditions of the limited
volume exception. In addition to maintaining Rule 17a-23's three-part reporting
requirements, the new rule should: (1) require reporting even if the system
sponsor is not a registered broker-dealer; and (2) require PTS to maintain
internal supervision of compliance with the securities laws, which the SEC will
oversee through examination of the PTSs' reports.27 In order to avoid
271. While this structure will require the SEC's Market Regulation Division to take a more active
regulatory role than it has been accustomed to with the other SROs, the small volume of these systems
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jeopardizing the confidentiality and proprietary nature of PTS design plans, the
SEC should dispense with prior comment, determining whether to grant the
exemption without public input. Volume numbers that are reported to the SEC,
however, should be released to the public because they do not implicate
secrecy concerns regarding the operational facilities of the systems.
Third, the SEC would need to modify or clarify some specific regulatory
provisions under section 6 of the Act in order to ensure a smooth transition to
full exchange registration. For instance, PTSs need to continue to be able to
allow institutional investors to have direct access to the systems, which might
require a reinterpretation of "member." The rules of governance regarding the
participation of members might need to be changed. Finally, rules regarding
SROs' ability to examine the internal operation of their members might need
to be altered, to avoid the tension that might develop as institutions or
competing broker-dealers are asked to open their books to the PTS sponsor-
turned-SRO.272 Admittedly, the SEC's ability to make the necessary changes
with regard to section 6 is more problematic, and congressional action could
be required either to change the provisions of section 6(b) directly or to allow
the SEC more discretion to do so through rulemaking.
Finally, to encourage innovation, the SEC should make a provision for the
established exchanges to develop their own alternative systems, such as the
NYSE's Crossing Sessions, with a similar regulatory exemption. Under the
concept of "functional" regulation, the exchanges should be authorized to
develop such systems in the absence of regulatory restraints, from which PTSs
will be free.273
This modified "limited volume" approach would accomplish several things
that the Rule 17a-23 approach does not. First, it acknowledges the structural
implications of these systems, as distinct from simple oversight concerns that
regulation as broker-dealers accomplishes; while approaching these systems as
broker-dealers does continue, as the SEC and PTSs point out, to give the SEC
some regulatory supervision of these systems, it does not give the SEC the
ability to monitor the regulatory issues presented by the PTS as entire systems,
rather than as merely automated brokers (i.e. concerns about trading rules or
"fair access" by investors). Second, it removes PTSs from the supervision of
the SROs, which presently serve as both regulators and competitors, a balance
will minimize the additional burden on the SEC.
272. The transformation to SRO or quasi-SRO status will not be easy, as this short list of potential
modifications indicates. In fact, concerns about problems with applying SRO requirements on PTSs has
been one major argument against continuation or expansion of the "limited volume" approach. See 1993
House Hearings, supra note 9, at 559-62. Note, however, that under the current system, regulated PTSs
must open their books to an SRO, the NASD, which also, in some capacities, acts as a competitor.
273. The NASD's recent experience with the introduction of its new Aqcess system illustrates this
disparity. The SEC killed the NASD's original proposed system, N-Prove, forcing the NASD to
continue operating with no system while developing this new one. Even now, with the laborious
proposal and comment procedure, the NASD will not be able to actually begin using the system for
another six months. Power, NASDAQ Unveils, supra note 41, at Cl.
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which, as discussed above, creates concerns for PTSs about having systematic
oversight of their operations.
This proposal also would accomplish some of the goals of the proposed
amendments to the Quote Rule with fewer problematic side effects. The current
rule proposals, while more fully addressing the transparency and market
structure issues than Rule 17a-23 does, have not addressed these issues in a
comprehensive way. The current proposals represent a poor trade-off between
the need for regulation to consider the structural implications of these systems
and the desire to encourage the competition and innovation they have brought
to the market. As mentioned earlier, the proposals' failure to reveal institution-
al trading interest means that price discovery will still be hampered by the
existence of PTSs. While the rule revisions do not completely address the
structural implications, they also may impose considerable costs on the systems
that could stifle further development and innovation. The new rules may drive
market makers and specialists out of the PTSs, either because it will no longer
represent a unique trading environment for them, or because they will choose
not to publish certain quotes in any markets. As mentioned above, one of the
advantages of the development of these systems is that they allow investors
with different trading needs to choose a trading environment that best
represents their needs, i.e. anonymity, low commission costs, immediacy, or
liquidity. By forcing market makers and specialists to behave identically with
respect to both PTSs and the primary markets, the SEC is undermining the
advantages offered by the "menu" of trading options.
The modified "limited volume" approach would, admittedly, impose costs
on the system that alternative systems might avoid. One cost that the new rule
proposal seeks to ameliorate would remain; trading interest would still not be
completely transparent while these systems continue to operate at the lower
level capacity. This cost, however, would be reduced to the extent that
arbitragers would continue to access both PTSs and the more "public" trading
arenas and could work to reduce price differentials between them. Moreover,
enhanced best execution obligations which encourage broker-dealers to search
PTSs for better prices when acting on behalf of their customers would bring
the advantages of PTSs' prices to the retail investor. Finally, this cost would
only be borne by the market until the system reaches the pre-determined size,
at which point the entire system's obligations to display trading interest to the
public market, as well as the system's obligations to publicize trading rules and
adopt other SRO functions, would increase.
The benefits achieved in return for these costs, moreover, would be
substantial. Overall, the approach outlined here would provide a better balance
between the competing goals of the NMS-intramarket competition and
centralized pricing. First, it would encourage the continuing development and
innovation represented by these systems. This innovation would pressure the
larger markets to provide their customers with competitive services and would
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encourage experimentation with markets that appeal to different trading
interests. This innovation would be accomplished within the lower volume
environment where the potential impact on the system, as well as the amount
of investor dollars at stake, is lower. At higher volumes, it would address some
of the potential for fraudulent trading practices in the systems and would help
maintain market integrity by providing protection for the NYSE, which acts as
the market of last resort. Market integrity would also be enhanced as the
investing public would be prevented from perceiving an unfair institutional
versus individual investor split. The SEC has already determined, at least with
respect to the traditional exchanges, that these benefits of SRO oversight are
worth its costs. Ultimately, this rule encourages development of these systems
during the start-up phase, yet provides for a smooth and predictable transfer
to more stringent regulations when they reach a size that warrants greater




Although PTSs account for only a small percentage of the total trading in
U.S. equity issues, this Article has argued that they implicate both individual
investor protection concerns and larger questions about how the U.S. securities
markets should be structured. Furthermore, the SEC's historical difficulty in
implementing NMS goals and tackling structural issues has extended to PTSs.
PTSs offer several market benefits. Their involvement in the market
furthers several NMS goals, including intramarket competition and lower
intermediary participation in trading. In addition, they may aid market linkage
by enhancing order display and order routing among multiple market centers.
In the face of these benefits, the existing exchanges argue that a financial crisis
will result in the wake of increasing market fragmentation. There is evidence
that the exchanges are still operating profitably and thus are not being fatally
injured by the presence of PTSs.275 Statistical analysis indicates that investors
are also not suffering in the current market. Spreads have generally nar-
274. Although this Article advocates regulation through the "limited volume" exchange mechanism,
regulation through the 15c2-10 approach would also be an approach that is preferable to the current
system. Rule 15c2-10, in fact, has some advantages to the "limited volume" approach because it avoids
the problem of exchange "membership" and exempts the PTSs from the regulatory costs of SRO status
which they claim will drive them out of business. Ultimately, however, the "limited volume" approach
seems to more adequately match the "functional regulation" approach by treating these systems, which
do fill many of the same functions as the exchanges, as exchanges. Moreover, as these systems grow,
continuing to regulate them under the auspices of an SRO which is also in competition with them will
not work as well as treating them as distinct entities. Rule 15c2-10, however, might provide some useful
guidance in fashioning the modifications necessary for the "limited volume" approach as it is outlined
here.
275. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, Study ImI, at 111-3.
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rowed,276 and average commissions have dropped.277 Arguments regarding
the basic superiority of the auction market are also questionable, given that the
powerful institutional investors frequently seek systems that offer them services
other than those offered by an auction market.
But the development of PTSs does carry real dangers. First, the established
exchanges have addressed the role of the NYSE as a market of last resort and
their need to be free from regulatory burdens to develop their own systems to
compete with PTSs.278 Second, "market competition" alone is not enough to
police the development of PTSs. Experience has shown that information
inequities in the market do not permit this.279 Third, the shifting of institu-
tional investor order flow to PTSs does produce a retail and institutional
investor split. While the import of this split is unclear, a perception that retail
investors cannot depend on fair market treatment may undermine investor
confidence in the market. Finally, the volume of transactions being routed to
PTSs is likely to increase in the future, which will strain the ability to regulate
them as broker-dealers.
An examination of the SEC's attempts to regulate PTSs reveals the ongoing
need to regulate PTSs adequately at the initial stage of the development of a
computerized trading environment.' This Article proposes an alternate
approach to the regulation of PTSs. Utilizing a modified "limited volume"
exemption from exchange regulation would enable the SEC to strike the
delicate balance between encouraging the development of PTSs and providing
sufficient protection for investors and existing markets.
276. MARKET 2000, supra note 5, exhibits 30 & 35 (showing a general trend towards lower spreads
since mid-1990).
277. There is some evidence that commissions have only dropped for institutional investors, while
retail commissions have increased. Taylor, supra note 31, at Al.
278. The SEC has recently adopted a new rule, which streamlines the SEC's rule change approval
process for the existing exchanges. Proposed Rule Changes of Self Regulatory Organizations, supra note
275. This new rule should help alleviate one of the regulatory differentials about which the exchanges
have most frequently complained. Completely equivalent regulation for computerized systems run by
exchanges and PTSs, however, may never be appropriate, as an investor may expect more regulation,
and thus more protection, in a system that is sponsored by an exchange rather than by a private entity.
279. Rule 17a-23 Proposal Release, supra note 99, at 8371 n.26 (noting that economic incentives
are not sufficient to prevent fraud).
280. Some commentators believe that further computerization of the market will eventually result
in complete market automation. Power, supra note 85, at AI (quoting William C. Freund, former chief
economic of the NYSE, who claims "the days of physical trading floors are numbered. Fully
computerized trading will become a reality.").

